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FOREWORD 
Remote sensing from space has a long standing tradition in earth observation and environmental 
monitoring. However, the use of commercial satellite imagery for monitoring arms control is a new field. 
This study deals with the application of commercial satellite imagery for international safeguards by 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 
The report summarises research activities which started in 1994 and have been carried out in co-
operation between King's College London, the University of London, the Research Centre Jülich, 
Program Group Technology Assessment and the Oepartment of Geography of the University of Bonn. 
Part of the work has been performed under the British and German support programmes for the IAEA 
and have been funded by the British Oepartment of Trade and Industry UK (OTI) and the German 
Federal Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Technology (BMBF). 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
During the 19605, there was a general agreement that the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, 
both horizontal as weil as vertical, would jeopardise world security. Therefore, non-proliferation was 
seen to be to the advantage of all states. This was to be achieved through aseries of bilateral, regional 
and multilateral arms control measures. The 1970 Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
(NPT) was the first intemational agreement to control the spread of nuclear weapons. By the end of 
June 1997, 185 states were parties to the NPT including all five nuclear-weapon states (NWS). The five 
NWS have voluntary Safeguards Agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).1 
One of the most important tasks for the IAEA was "to establish and administer safeguards 
designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and 
information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not 
used in such a way as to further any military purposes; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the 
parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of aState, to any of that State's 
activities in the field of atomic energy" (article 111.5, IAEA Statute). Thus, the Agency provides a legal 
institutional framework for managing international co-operation as weil as control in the use of nuclear 
energy. 
The IAEA verifies compliance with the NPT related safeguards and three regional nuclear 
agreements, the 1967 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco 
Treaty), the 1986 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Rarotonga Treaty) and the 1996 African 
Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty). Thus, the importance of the Agency's safeguards cannot 
be over emphasised. For the EUROPEAN COMMISSION Safeguards are camed out under the 
EURATOM treaty by the EUROPEAN Safeguards Directorate. The interface and the relation to the NPT 
Safeguards are regulated through the verification agreement. 
As required by the NPT (article X.2), the Review and Extension Conference was convened 
between 17 April and 12 May 1995 in New York. At the time of the Review Conference there were 178 
parties of which 175 participated in the conference. The Parties, without a vote, adopted, as part of 
three Presidential proposals, indefinite extension of the Treaty. The parties also stated that "Decisions 
adopted by its Board of Governors aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness of Agency 
safeguards should be supported and implemented and the Agency's capability to detect undeclared 
nuclear activities should be increased."2 
The Agency's efforts to detect undeclared nuclear activities resulted from the discovery, in the early 
1990, of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme. In 1993 and 1994, the Director General's Standing 
Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) formulated specific recommendations 
regarding the detection of undeclared activities. One of the recommendations advised "assessment of 
the usefulness, technical feasibility associated costs and acceptability of the Agency obtaining satellite 
11AEA Yearbook, 1991, (IAEA, Vienna), p. E3. 
2The document NPT/Conf.1995/L5, the second principle. 
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photographs from commercial sources".3 In June 1993, after discussions in the Board of Governors, 
these recommendations were translated into the Secretariat's development programme to strengthen 
safeguards, known as "Programme 93+2", for cost-effectively strengthening the safeguards 
procedures.4 (INFCIRC 540) 
1.2 Why commercial satellites? 
The attitude of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was important in 1995 because 
it may have influenced the thinking of other states in the region on their approach to the 1995 NPT 
Review Conference. North Korea joined the NPT on 12 December 1985, but it was not until30 January 
1992 that it signed the safeguards agreement with the IAEA. On 9 April 1992 the North Korean 
parliament ratified its and the safeguards agreement came into force on the following day committing 
the country to open its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspections within 90 days. The DPRK, on 4 May 1992, 
provided the IAEA a list of its nuclear facilities. This included uranium mining, refining facilities, a fuel 
fabrication plant, and three operating reactors {two of which are believed to be plutonium production 
reactors),6 
It is worth considering the events in the DPRK over aperiod between 1989 and 1993. As part of 
the safeguards agreement, in order to establish the correctness of the information provided, the IAEA 
began its first inspection of North Korea's nuclear facilities between 25 May and 6 June 1992.7 The 
second inspection began on 6 July 1992 during which the focus was, among other things, on the 
reprocessing facilities. Prior to these inspections, the IAEA Director General Hans Blix visited so me of 
these facilities and reported that North Korea was building a reprocessing plant which had been 
claimed by them to be a "radiochemical laboratoryn,s At this facility small amounts of plutonium have 
been separated. When operational, it may be capable of 200 kg/a throughput.9 The extraction of 
plutonium for use in North Korea's breeder programme had been given as the justification for such a 
plant. The third inspection was carried out between 31 August and 15 September 1992. Since this time 
there have been more inspections. 
Perhaps the most important activity under the IAEA inspections of the DPRK was the sampling of 
material presented for verification at the reprocessing (radiochemical laboratory) plant. The material 
was declared by the DPRK as the plutonium product and associated waste solutions resulting from a 
single reprocessing campaign carried out in 1990 of spent fuel from its 5 MWe reactor.10 By July 1992, 
differences began to appear between the isotopic analyses made by the IAEA on the spent fuel and the 
information given by the DPRK on the reprocessing of the fuel. Three different amounts of americium-
241 (241Am) were measured by the IAEA in a plutonium sampie provided by the DPRK in 1992. This 
suggested that it had reprocessed the spent fuel on three occasions in 1989, 1990 and 1991 and not 
once as declared by the DPRK. The 241Am, a decay product from plutonium-241, begins to build up 
after removal of 241PU from reprocessing effectively providing the date when the fuel had been 
: SAR-17, R.eport to the. Direct?~ General on the 38th Series of SAGSI meeting, 21-24 March 1994. 
~~~~~d, B., Safeguards In transition: Status, challenges, and opportunities", IAEA Bulletin, vol. 36, no. 3, September 1994, 
51AEA Press Release, PR 92120, 10 April 1992. 
61AEA Press Release, PR 92124,5 May 1992. 
7Nuclear Fuel, 22 June 1992, pp.15-16. 
81AEA Press Release, PR 92125,15 May 1992. 
9lbid, Nuclear Fuel. 
lOIAEA, INFCIRC/419, 8 April 1993. 
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reprocessed. Moreover, the ratio of uranium to plutonium and 239pU, 240PU and 241PU in separated 
plutonium could provide additional information on the date when separation occurred. It appeared that 
reprocessing had occurred several times and not only once. 
As a result of this and the information acquired by the IAEA from other sources, the Agency 
requested several more sampies and permission to visit two sites located in the Yongbyon Nuclear 
Research Centre. The Agency believed these facilities to be related to nuclear waste. Initially the 
permission to inspect these sites was granted. It was found that one site was not related to any nuclear 
activities. Inspection of the second site, which was under military control, was limited to observations of 
the one floor only while the building had another floor below ground. It is also under military control. 
Even with additional information provided by the North Korean authorities, the discrepancy between the 
IAEA measurements and the information provided remained, forcing the Agency to conclude that 
undeclared reprocessed fuel may be stored at the site. 11 If true then the implication was that there was 
more plutonium in the country than declared to the Agency. 
In February 1993, the IAEA requested "special inspections" of the two undeclared sites that were 
suspected to be linked to North Korea's weapons programme.12 Essentially this triggered, on 12 March 
1993, the DPRK to announce, under the provision of article X.I of the NPT, its intention to withdraw 
from the NPT. The reasons for this were given in a statement to the 154 NPT parties and the three 
depository States, Russia, the UK and the USA. In defence of this action, the DPRK stated that "It is on 
the basis of the "intelligence information" fabricated by the United States ... that some officials of the 
IAEA secretariat are trying to enforce the inspection of our major military installations which are 
unrelated to nuclear activities".13 It was also stated that the IAEA's insistence on the inspections of the 
two sites was "an encroachment on the sovereignty of (North Korea), an interference in its internal 
affairs, and a hostile act aimed at stifling our socialism."14 
In spite of several efforts by the Agency to resolve the dispute, the DPRK conveyed to the Director 
General that its decision to withdraw from the NPT would remain unchanged "until ... IAEA Secretariat 
returns to its principle of independence and impartiality."15 In view of all of this, the IAEA's Director 
General Hans Blix informed the Board on 21 March 1993 that "as of now, the DPRK continues to be in 
non-compliance with its general obligation to co-operate in the implementation of the Safeguards 
Agreement provided for in Article 3 of that Agreement."16 After intense negotiations, at the end of 1993, 
the DPRK agreed to IAEA's access to the seven declared nuclear facilities for one-time inspection with 
no question of granting entry to the two suspected nuclear waste sites. 
This whole saga iIIustrated the need for the Agency to acquire independently information relevant 
to its safeguards activities. In order to have confidence in the indefinitely extended NPT, it is essential 
to consider ways of strengthening of the IAEA's safeguards procedures. To this end an examination of 
contribution from observations from space becomes vital. For example, in the case of the DPRK, the 
Agency could have used both SPOT and some Russian data to support its need to carry out "special 
inspections" . 
11lbid, p.4. 
12Nucleonics Week, vol. 34, no. 11, 18 March 1993, pp.1 and 9-10. 
13Statement of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 12 March 1993, IAEA INFCIRC/419, 8 
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Had the DPRK carried out its threat to leave the NPT, it would have had a senous impact on the 
1995 NPT Review Conference and on the treaty itself. For example, with the development and testing 
(on 29 May 1993) by the DPRK of its Rodong 1 missile with a ~~nge of about 1 :O?O km, some countries 
in the region may have become concerned about their secuntles.17 A renunclatlon of the NPT by the 
DPRK might have triggered others in the region to re-consider their attitude to the NPT. Thus, unless 
better safeguards procedures are developed soon for the IAEA, the success of the NPT may be 
jeopardised. 
Information gathered from space played an important role in uncovering the nuclear activities of, for 
example, Iraq and the DPRK. The non-intrusive nature of observations from space adds to its 
attractiveness. However, the nature of the source of information about Iraq and the DPRK was such 
that detailed analysis by the IAEA on them would not have been possible. On the other hand 
commercial satellite data are generally available without restnctions. Therefore, it is important now to 
examine how feasible, practical and cost-effective such a technique is for the enhancement of the 
IAEA's safeguards system. It is important, however, to realise that satellite observation by itself is not 
enough. Collateral information from many sources needs to be collected and examined. 
At present the PRC, France, India, Japan, Russia and the United States launch and operate civil 
remote sensing satellites (see appendix I). The European Space Agency (ESA, a 15-nation consortium) 
joined these when the ERS-1 satellite was launched on 16 July 1991. Of these, only France and the 
USA have been actively distributing their satellite data on a commercial basis. These have now been 
joined by India, Japan and the Russian Federation. 
Since the launch of the first civil remote sensing satellite by the USA in 1972 (Landsat 1), the 
quality of images, measured in terms of the resolution of a sensor (see appendix I), from subsequent 
civil satellites has improved some 70 to 80 fold. For example, Russia is marketing images with about 
2m resolution and the USA has been declassifying images with similar resolutions acquired from its 
early (until about 1972) classified satellites. It should be mentioned here that recently the USA has also 
been considering the sale of data with resolution of about one metre obtained from its planned 
commercial satellites.18 Thus, verification, using such satellites, becomes possible. 
1.3 The IAEA and observation satellites 
.During the past few years some criticism has been levelled against the verification procedures 
carned out by the IAEA. The main criticism, for example, has been its failure to detect until quite late 
much of the Iraqi nuclear weapon programmes. By and large this has been because of the lack of 
adequate information available to the IAEA on the undeclared nuclear activities in such regions. This 
has been recognis~d by th~ Director General of the Agency who has stated that " ... satellite imagery can 
be very helpful to Inform mspectors where there is reason to look for evidence. ...it does not seem 
reasonable that the Agency should refrain from utilising a type of information that is available to the 
whole world ev~n commercially - and that has long been used for confidence building in the field of 
arms control. ... It would be preferable for an international organisation to obtain such imagery from 
several sources or from an international satellite agency."19 
~:!,mai, R., "Asian am.bitions, risin~ tensions", The Bulletin of Atomic Scientist, vol. 49, no. 5, June 1993 33-36 
19 Ever h~ve.the feeling someone ~ watehing you?", Time International, vol. 142, no. 23, 29 November 19~~' 21' 
Hans Bllx, Statement to the ReView and Extension Conference of the Parties t th T .' p. . . 
Nuclear Weapons, New York, 17 April 1995", IAEA, C22. 0 e reaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
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Also it should be noted here that IAEA's safeguards would be triggered when sales of nuclear 
materials or facilities occur and are reported to the Agency by the exporters and or by the recipients 
(article 111.1 and 2 of the NPT, Paragraph 34, INFCIRC/153, and Paragraph 15, INFCIRC/66/Rev.2). If a 
facility is built or nuclear material is acquired indigenously, then it is the responsibility of the non-
nuclear-weapon-state (NNWS) party to the safeguards agreement to inform the IAEA so that it can 
apply safeguards. If this does not occur, as seems to have been the case with Iraq, the Agency, at 
present, has no possibility to know when and where to carry out its inspections unless a member state 
with better sources of information informs the Agency of any undeclared facilities of another State party 
to the Treaty. Such a source could be observations fram satellites. 
Here is the importance of observation satellites for monitoring nuclear activities of parties to the 
NPT as weil as of those to the other two regional non-proliferation treaties. The use of satellites for this 
was first recognised publicly when US spacecraft detected the undeclared nuclear facilities of, for 
example, Iraq. The USA gave the IAEA the relevant information for it to conduct inspections. This 
method worked for Iraq because it followed the 1991 Gulf War. On the other hand, the use of such a 
technique could cause considerable political difficulties, highlighting the general problems that the IAEA 
faces, and iIIustrating the need for the IAEA to acquire its own information. At present one possible 
source is information gathered by civil commercial satellites. 
The intrusive nature of any verification procedure complicates the control of the spread of weapons 
and the IAEA's safeguards pracedure is no exception. It is important to devise a non-intrusive 
monitoring method for the Agency in order to enhance its safeguards without creating political 
difficulties. Observations from space could help. This is particularly true for the detection of possible 
undeclared nuclear sites. It is, therefore, useful to investigate the possibilities of using information 
acquired fram civil remote sensing satellites. 
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2 IMAGE SPECIFICATION AND ANALYSIS 
2.1 Types of data available 
Generally optical and radar sensors are carried on separate observation satellites. For example, 
the French SPOT, the Indian IRS-1C and the US Landsat have optical sensors only while the European 
ERS and the Japanese JERS se ries of satellites and the Canadian Radarsat carry only a radar sensor. 
While the SPOT satellites carry both panchromatic (with a spatial resolution of 10m) and multispectral 
sensors (20m), the range and the spectral resolutions are not as good as those of the US Landsat 
satellites (30m). However, the latter does not have a panchromatic sensor on board. On the other hand 
the Indian IRS-1C carries both panchromatic (5,am) and multispectral sensors (23m), the latter being as 
good as the Landsat TM sensor with the exception of the thermal IR sensor. The IRS-1 C has no 
thermal sensor. Consider first optical multispectral images only. 
A multispectral image over a specific area is one in which simultaneous data collection is carried 
out in three or more spectral regions of the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum. The sensor may measure 
reflections or emissions of radiation from the earth's surface or objects on the earth's surface. The 
oldest and the best known multispectral sensor is the human eye but this is sensitive only in the visible 
part of the EM spectrum (see Figure 2.1). 
Optical images could be divided into multispectral, hyper-spectral or ultra-spectral data. These are 
distinguished by bandwidth and the number of the spectral bands. For example, a multispectral sensor 
has a broad bandwidth and less than ten spectral bands. Examples of this are the US Landsat TM with 
seven bands, the Indian IRS-1C with four and the French SPOT satellite with three bands. Such 
satellites have been in orbit since 1972. On the other hand a hyper-spectral sensor has a narrow 
bandwidth and several hundreds of spectral bands. An example of this is the US satellite called Lewis 
which was put in orbit on August 1997, but the contact with the satellite was lost permanently. This 
satellite has been developed under the US Small Spacecraft Technology Initiative. It had a Hyper 
Spectr~1 Imager (HSI) consisting of 384 spectral bands in the range of 0.4 to 2.5Jlm with a spectral 
resolution of 5 to 6.25 nm and a spatial resolution of 30m. The satellite also had onboard a 
panchromatic camera ~ith a spatial resolution of Sm. Another type of sensor under development is an 
ultra-spectral sensor, wlth a very narrow bandwidth and thousands of spectral bands. 
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Figure 2.1: Sensitivity of various satellite sensors and spectral responses of some materials to different 
wavelengths of the electromagnetic radiation. 
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In the studies carried out so far, only panchromatic and some multispectral data in the visible range 
have been explored. In the case of the latter, the near infrared (NIR), short-wave IR (SWIR), mid-wave 
IR (MWIR) and long-wave IR (LWIR) could be used to identify features such as disturbed soils and 
vegetation which may not be visible to the human eyes. A sensor sensitive to LWIR can detect emitted 
radiance from, for example, heated buildings and warm water used for cooling nuclear facilities and 
discharged into rivers, water reservoirs or lakes. 
Ultra-spectral sensors are still at a research and development stage. These sensors could be used 
to detect subtle spectral differences in signatures that are too narrow to be detected using simple three-
band multispectral data. Hyper- and ultra-spectral imaging is an emerging technology. Using this, 
identification of specific materials, components of aerosols, gas plumes and effluents could be possible. 
Each object or material has a unique signature based on its reflectance properties. A multispectral 
sensor records these reflectance characteristics. Using sophisticated image processing techniques, the 
spectral differences of materials could be exploited in identifying them. For example, when different 
types camouflage are used, it would be possible to detect this using multispectral images. Also if 
underground facilities are constructed, stressed vegetation, which grows on the earth-covered bunkers, 
could be distinguished from normal vegetation because of the root growth, drainage, and soil conditions 
are different. 
Information derived from imaging radar, such as a synthetic aperture radar (SAR), is very different 
from that obtained from optical sensors. This is because a SAR is particularly sensitive to the 
geometrical characteristics of the surface and the object being monitored as weil as to their dielectric 
properties. While the interaction between the optical radiation and an object is determined by structures 
on micron scales and by processes that involve chemical absorption, microwave radiation can 
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penetrate significant distances into an object, the depth of which could be comparable to the 
wavelengths of the radiation. This could be a few centimetres to a few tens of metres. Generally the 
longer the wavelength the greater the penetration. For example, there is very limited penetration 
through the surface layers by radiation with C-band wavelength and the radar backscatter is determined 
by the surface structure of the objects. On the other hand at L-band, SIR-C radar beam is known to 
have penetrated several metres of dry sand. 
Interaction of microwave energy with materials does not only depend on the wavelength but also 
on the polarisation of the radar beam. For example, a vertically polarised electric field of the ERS SAR 
interacts more strongly with objects with steep surfaces than would a horizontally-polarised beam. Such 
interactions lead to differences both in the power scattered back in those different polarisation modes 
and in the degree of penetration through the surface of the object. 
A number of SAR sensors are now in orbit operated by various countries. A multi-channel radar 
exploits the fact that the interaction of microwave beam with matter is influenced by frequency and 
polarisation of aradar beam. The response of the latter to different shapes or scattering elements of an 
object will depend on the selection of horizontal or vertical polarisation. The US SIR-C/X-SAR 
experiments during April and October 1994 generated such multi-parameter SAR data from space. 
Clearly in addition to the optical data, such radar information should now be tried when monitoring 
nuclear fuel cycle. For example, if the scattered radar signals from an object reflect the dielectric 
properties of the object, then a change in temperature of, for instance, water in a lake or a river due to 
the discharge of cooling water, should be reflected in the returned radar beam. In a single test such a 
change has been detected but more rigorous work needs to be carried out. The greatest advantage of 
a SAR sensor is its ability to provide all-weather day and night information. Combining this with optical 
data, the technique could become a very powerful tool for the IAEA. 
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2.2 So me image processing techniques 
Basic interpretation of images using such simple image enhancement techniques as contrast 
stretching and edge enhancement is possible particularly when panchromatic images are used and 
geometrical shapes, such as buildings and roads, are involved. However, more sophisticated 
interpretation requires not only the use of multispectral data but complex image processing techniques. 
For example, in a multi-band image, the subtraction of one band from another creates a new image 
which may provide a black and white image with better contrast to aid analysis. Using a ratio of two 
bands, for example TM band 4 and band 3, would highlight information differently. Such enhancement 
may be used to differentiate camouflaged targets from background terrain. Thus, in general, image 
processing can be summarised as image restoration, rectification and registration, enhancement and 
classification. Some of these categories have been used in the earlier studies. 
Classification technique, not explored so far, is a pattem-based process of assigning individual 
pixels in an image to cover land classes or different objects on the basis of spectral reflectance. Such 
classification could be supervised or unsupervised. 
Supervised classification is very much controlled by humans. In this process pixels which 
correspond to recognised patterns and features are identified with the help from collateral data. 
Representative training areas are determined which are then used to train the computer to identify 
features elsewhere in the image. The collateral information can be from aerial photographs or ground 
descriptions of nuclear facilities. If none of them is available, clustering results could be used. 
Unsupervised classification (clustering) is primarily a computer process for selecting natural 
groupings or patterns of pixels with similar spectral characteristics. In this process the analyst has 
minimum input. A specified set of parameters are used by the computer to uncover statistical patterns 
that are inherent in the image data. This method is usually used when less is known about the site 
under investigation. After such classification, the analyst can give interpretation to the resulting classes. 
Pattern recognition is a technique of finding known patterns in an image which can be extracted 
through spectral classification or by geometrical shapes. By spatially and spectrally enhancing an 
image, pattern recognition can be performed by humans or, automatically by a computer system; 
spectral recognition can be performed automatically. Also if, for example, some common shapes of 
nuclear facilities are determined, it is possible to train a computer to seek out such patterns in an 
image. While automatic pattern recognition is by no means an easy task, it is important that a method is 
found for recognising, using computers, various elements of a nuclear fuel cycle. In this, the newly 
agreed Protocol for the Application of Safeguards is important. Under the provision of exchange of 
information, a party is required to give "A general description of each building on each site, including its 
use and, if not apparent from that description, its contents. The description shall include a map of the 
site."(Article 2.iii) Armed with such information, the use of digital elevation model (DEM) techniques 
could be a very useful tool as it would enable the Agency to create three dimensional pictures of the 
site to be visited and give it a better sense of what and where to look for different activities. The site 
diagrams would also make automatic pattern recognition task more feasible. 
Change detection is a process in which differences in the status of an object or a phenomenon 
are identified by observing them at different times. The main idea is that changes in buildings, 
infrastructure etc. must result in changes in grey level values of the relevant pixels. Several methods 
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can be used to detect changes: image differencing (or other arithmetic operations), multitemporal 
classification or post-classification comparison as weil as linear transformations. 
Geographie information systems (GIS) is yet another powerfu~ to?1 wh~ch enh.an~es !he 
interpretability of images acquired from space. Normally image interpretation IS carned out In Isolation 
without actually integrating, with a satellite acquired image, any other external information. An important 
starting point is to geocode the image. This is carried out by re-sampling each data set to a uniform 
pixel size which is registered to a geographie co-ordinate system. A GIS is a system for collecting, 
storing, organising, integrating, manipulating and analysing and displaying a set of geographie data. 
These could be digital maps or non-spatial information such as tabulated demographie information. 
2.3 Methods of data recording and retrieval 
The Russian high resolution data are recorded on films and the whole satellite with its photographie 
content is physically recovered and, therefore, in this case the question of data transmission does not 
arise. All other satellites transmit their data electronically to the ground stations. However, this has 
limitation because the satellite has to be in line of sight of a ground station to retrieve the data. For this 
reason, a number of ground stations spread round the globe have been established by the operators of 
the US Landsat and the French SPOT satellites. The distribution and the coverage of these stations 
need to be assessed. 
Generally at present information gathered from space is recorded on an on-board tape recorder to 
be played back when the satellite is over a ground receiving station. However, not all satellites have 
tape recorders on board and in any case tape recorders tend to be unreliable because they are 
mechanical devices which could get damaged during the launch phase. Recently, this is overcome by 
deploying solid state data storage devices on board satellites. Such capabilities should be assessed. 
Data can be transmitted via communications satellites to the ground station but this is not generally 
available. It is therefore, important to investigate whether the current generation commercial 
com~unications satellites are capable of handling the data rates resulting from civil observation 
satelhtes. For example, the US Landsat-5 transmits the TM data at a rate of 83 MB/s. While the French 
SPOT satellite has a tape recorder on board, its data transmission rate is 50 MB/s and that for the 
Europea~ E~S-1 is 1?0 MB/s. It is, therefore, important to investigate the capabilities of commercial 
c~mmumcatlons sat~lhtes to ~ete~ine whether they are capable of handling such high data rates. It 
mlght be useful to dlsc~s~ thls wlth a number of civil communications satellite operators such as the 
In~a~at. A m~re promlsmg method may be the use of mobile ground-based receiving stations for 
retnevlng satelhte data. 
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3 OBSERVATIONS OF SOME NUCLEAR FACILITIES FROM SPACE: 
CASE STUDIES 
The Sites and type of data examined are listed in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1. Nuclear sites investigated 
···$ltil"I,~a·.·.·.· •. ·•··· FrS.II. .i···D.ta~f····.·.·.·.···.······ .DaWo~irna~s··.········ ~ati~loCatiOlt!~L~ •• 
Baghdad (Iraq) KVR-1000 Film CCT 27/06/1991 Reactors and reprocessing at 
SPOT Pan 12/05/1991 Tuwaitha and enrichment at 
Tarmiya/33.20N,44.26E 
Dimona (Israel) SPOT CCT Pan/10 08/10/1991 Nuclear com~ex 
PINSTECH SPOT CCT Pan /10 18/0211992 Nuclear research centre 
(Pakistan) KVR-1000 Film positive/2 
Yongbyon (North SPOT CCT Pan/10 19/09/1989 Nuclear complex 
Korea) Landsat XS/20 11/06/1986 
TM/30 01/06/1992 
Kyshtym (Russia) Landsat CCTTM/30 01/08/1987 Plutonium production 
13/05/1993 
Sellafield (UK) SPOT CCT PAN/10 19/03/1990 Repoarring facility 
Landsat XS/20 30/06/1986 
TM/30 10/0211989 
Almelo (Holland) Landsat CCTTM/30 19/07/1992 Enrichment facility 
Gronau (GermallY) Landsat CCTTM/30 19/07/1992 Enrichment facility 
Hanau (Germany) Landsat CCTTM/30 03/07/1991 Fuel fabrication facili!Y. 
Russian facility Landsat CCT 1/08/1987 and Reactors 
XSdata 13/05/1993 
ERS-2 SAR CCT 7 Mc!y 1993 
Dungeness (UK) SPOTXS CD-ROM 9 December 1986 Power reactor 







Gorleben (Germany) Landsat CD-ROM 24/08/1984 Interim spent tuel element and 
31/08/1989 low-Ievel radioactive waste 
KVR-1000 CD-ROM Date unknown storage; a pilot conditioning 
facility; exploratory mine 
*Degrees and minutes of latitude and longitude. 
Besides SPOT panchromatic and SPOT multispectral there are Landsat TM5 multispectral images 
analysed. Moreover, KVR-1000 panchromatic and ERS-2 SAR radar images are also analysed. 
14 POSSIBLE ApPLICATIONS OF COMMERCIAL SATELLITE IMAGERY FOR INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS 
3.1 Iraqi Tuwaitha nuclear facilities 
Around Baghdad there were two important nuclear complexes, AI Tuwaitha to the south and AI 
Tarmiya to the north of the city. In the former, examined in this re port, Iraq had constructed three 
nuclear facilities which it had declared under its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. These were the 
Russian IRT-5000 5 MWth reactor fuelled with highly enriched uranium, the Tammuz-2 500 kWth 
French reactor, and small fuel fabrication and storage plants. Near AI Tarmiya, an enrichment facility 
using electromagnetic isotopic separation (EMIS) method had been under development. 
On 15 May 1997, the Board of Govemors of the IAEA approved new measures to strengthen its 
safeguards procedures under an additional protoco\' Under this, aState Party will be committed to 
provide the Agency a general description of each building on a site with a map of the facility as weil as 
other relevant information. The usefulness of such maps is iIIustrated below. 
Consider the AI Tuwaitha facility. A site diagram20 of the complex is shown in Figure 3.0. An extract 
from a panchromatic image (10m pixel resolution) acquired over Baghdad by the French SPOT satellite 
on 12 May 1991 (i.e. after the Gulf War in February 1991) is shown in Figure 3.1. Security building (a), 
chemical research laboratory (b), the site of the Tammuz-1 and -2 research reactors (c), and an 
unidentified building 43 (d) are marked in the Figure and discussed below. Using the Adobe 
Photoshop21 image processing software, the site diagram was corrected for size and orientation and 
was then overlaid on the satellite image as shown in Figure 3.2, in which at A, a number of buildings 
can be seen on the image but they do not appear on the site diagram. 
On 27 June 1990, before the Gulf War, a Russian Cosmos satellite carrying a KVR-1000 high 
resolution panchromatic camera (about 2m photographic resolution) took a picture of Baghdad. An 
extract from the full scene is shown in Figure 3.3. The image in this figure was obtained by scanning a 
small section of the original positive transparency using an Agta Arcus 2 flat bed scanner. The 
resolution of the scanned image is 2,400 pixels/inch. 
While the resolution of the original data was degraded somewhat, this facilitated comparison 
between the Russian analogue image and the digital one obtained by the SPOT satellite. As betore, the 
line drawing of Figure 3.0 was overlaid on this image as shown in Figure 3.4. A number of the 
unregistered buildings can be seen in the image (marked A) indicating that these buildings have been 
there for at least one year. Also, new buildings have been constructed between 27 June 1990 and 12 
May 1991. Examples of these are marked by B in Figures 3.2 and 3.4. So me of the other differences 
between these images were identified by eye and they are highlighted in Figure 3.5. 
~9~~),P~~~ ~~5~1 ~~~OSki, R., "Technology and the proliferation of nuclear weapons", 1995, (SIPRI, Oxford University Press, 
21 Adobe Photoshop version 3.0 manufactured by Adobe Systems Incorporated, Mount View, California, USA. 
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Figure 3.0. A map of the Tuwaitha nuclear complex. 








From the site diagram, it can be seen that a number of buildings do not appear on the diagram but 
they can be seen in the satellite image. This iIIustrates a method that can be used to check the initial 
data a Member State might supply the Agency under the new Additional Protocol. For example, under 
the Article 2, the Party is required to give a general description of each building on each site as weil as 
a map of the site. 
A possible quantitative measure was investigated for determining changes in a scene. First the two 
images acquired at different times are co-registered so that they match exactly and then they are 
subtracted one from the other. However, this process changes the original pixel values in one image 
which would then make the interpretation of the results difficult. This is particularly true when spectral 
analysis is to be carried out on a multispectral image. Also, if this method were used in the present 
case, the KVR-1000 image would have to be re-sampled in order to match its resolution with the SPOT 
image. This would change the pixel values of this image even more. In addition, corrections due to 
radiometrie differences resulting from different atmospheric conditions (e.g. position of the Sun, 
humidity, etc.) have to be applied. Thus, it was necessary to use another method of comparing the 
images without changing their pixel values. 
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. I t' ) acquired by French SPOT over Baghdad Figure 3.1. An extract from a fun ~cene (10m pixel reso u Ion T uwaitha after the Gulf War. building 
on 12 May 1991 showing the lraql nuclear :eactor c~Plex at f~nd -2 research reactors and an unidentified (a), chemical research laboratory (~), the slte ofthe ammuz-
building 43 (d) are identified from Flgure 3.0. 
Source: CNEC/SPOT Image. 
In the example, the changes to be detected were due to some of the buildings being damaged or 
destroyed during the Gulf War. A satellite image is usually available in the form of digital data with its 
pixels attributed minimum and maximum reflectance values 0 (for black pixels) and 255 (for white 
ones). Values in between represent different gray levels. Buildings tend to be highly reflective 
comparad to the soil so that a destroyed building will appear darker than anormal one. Thus, for 
example, If the distribution or histogram of the grey levels as a function of the number of pixels is 
examined, it is found that the maximum will be loeated near the high values of grey levels If the 
buildings were neither eamouflaged nor destroyed. This is used in the following analysis. 
It had been reported that, at the AI Tuwaitha site, a number of buildings were damaged by bombing 
during the 1991 Gulf War.22 Two such sites at b (a chemieallaboratory) and C building near the 
loeation ofthe TammuZ-1 and -2 reactors), from Figures 3.1 and 3.3 respectively, were Also 
'''''''''''''''', p. 109. 
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from these figures, it can be seen that the site a has not changed significantly. This is not unreasonable 
as the site seems to be a security building at the entrance gate to the complex. Also the building at d 
appears unchanged in both images. The distributions of the reflectance values as a function of the 
number of pixels were plotted for these small extracts (see Figures 3.6 to 3.9). 
Figure 3.2. Site diagram of Figure 3.0 overlaid on the satellite image of Figure 3.1 (12 May 1991). Buildings that 
are not marked on the site diagram are indicated by A. B indicates possible new constructions. Compare these 
with the images in Figures 3.3 and 3.4. 
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POSSISLE ApPLICATlONS OF OMMEn .... 
. R' n Cosmos satellite KVR-1000 sensor m photographie 
Figura 3.3. An extract of a full sc~ne acqUired by 19~~sl~ before the Gulf War. Security building (a), chemical 
resolution). The image was a?qUlred on 27 June1 d' ~~~search reactors (c) and an building (d) research laboratory (b), the slte of the Tammuz- an - , 
are identified from Figure 3.0. 
Source:KVR-1000 
Although two sensors with different spatial resolutions were used to acquire the images. their 
speetral eharacteristics are very similar, 0.51..Q.73 ... m for SPOT and O.58..Q.72 ... m for the Russian KVR-
1000 camera. The images were aequired in 1990 and 1991 at nearly the same time of the year (see 
Figure 3.5). Thus, any differences in the characteristics of the extraets from the two images are likely to 
be due to the changes at the site, te. structural ehanges of the buildings, and not because of the 
atmospheric, seasonal or lighting conditions. There are effects, such as radiometrie differences due to 
ageing of buildings or structural changes such as reconstruction of a flat-topped to a sloping or glass 
fram a tiled roof building, which may change the reflectance values. To avoid atmospheric and seasonal 
variations, relative ehanges in the extracts from the same image were examined and the histograms 
ware compared for the two images. The histograms should be similar for buildings from the same image 
unless they have been physically ehanged, for example, due to destruction. 
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Figure 3.4. Site diagram of Figure 3.0 overlaid on the Russian satellite image acquired on June 1990, before 
the Gulf War. Buildings that are not marked on the site diagram of Figure 3.0 are indicated by A. Compare these 
with those in Figure 3.2. 
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. (1) and the SPOT image acquired on 12 May 1991 Figure 3.5. The KVR·1000 image acqUlred on 27 June 1990 d during this period Same of these are highlighted 
show same of the changes, identified by eye, that occurre . 
by brackets. 
Histograms of the distribution of reflectance as a function of number of pixels for all the four sites in 
each of the two images (Figure 3.1 and 3.3) were determined. Figure 3.6 shows the four histograms for 
the different building sites in the Russian KVR-1000 image. It can be seen that, except for the building 
at C, all the other three histograms are very similar, suggesting that in 1990, Le. before the Gulf War, no 
camouflage had been used. On the other hand, building at cis less reflective. This is confirmed by the 
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mean values of the pixels for the three similar sites being similar and higher than the site at c. 
Therefore, it is concluded that the roof of building c may be made of a different material. 
A similar analysis was carried out using extracts of the same sites fram a SPOT image. These are 
shown in Figures 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9. In Figure 3.7, the histogram for the site of the building at c in Figure 
3.1 is compared with that for the gate at a. As before, the mean value for the building site is lower than 
that for the gate. Similar observation can be made for the site b. These suggest that changes at these 
sites have occurred. It should be remembered that comparisons of various buildings are made between 
buildings in the same image and not between those from images acquired on different occasions. 
Thus, it can be seen that comparison of histograms could be a useful quick way to detect changes 
in a facility. This method needs to be explored further. The advantage of a high resolution image, such 
as the Russian KVR-1000, is also clear. For example, the identification of facilities is easier fram an 
image such as Figure 3.3 than fram Figure 3.1. The former, because of its higher resolution would 
retain the definition when enlarged compared with the latler in which case it will begin to show pixels. 
This is in spite of the fact that the image in Figure 3.3 had already lost some quality because, for this 
study, it was obtained by scanning the original photographie image. Also multispectral images would 
help to determine changes in the spectral characteristics of objects on the ground. Not only this but 
detection of changes could be easierwith such data. This is investigated below. 
Similar analysis was carried over the AI Tarmiya EMIS enrichment site. Figure 3.10 shows 
panchromatic images acquired by the Russian KVR-1000 sensor and the French SPOT satellite. On a 
site diagram23, the EMIS machine housing was identified. This is indicated at (a) in Figure 3.11. It can 
also be seen from Figures 3.10 and 3.11 that the buildings at (b) and (c) have been changed. The one 
at b divided into three sections may be a result of damage caused as a result of the Gulf War or it may 
have resulted from the IAEA's dismantling process. The site at c, not identified in the map, appears to 
be damaged also. Whether this was the result of the 1991 war or the dismantling process is difficult to 
determine from these images, but it is clear that with the use of a site diagram it is simpler to see where 
changes may have taken place at a site and where information on a site might have been withheld. 
Figure 3.6. Histograms of the four extracts (a, b, c and d) fram the image in Figure 3.3. 
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Figure 3.8. Histograms of tOO two extracts (a and b) fram the image in Figure 3.1. 
SPOT 1991 





Figure 3.9. Histograms ofthe two extracts (a and d) form the image in Figure 3.1. 
SPOT 1991 














The above examples iIIustrated that changes in the infrastructure of a declared can be 
detected by commercial remote sensing satellites that may avoid on-site inspections. Moreover, such 
imagery would unable the IAEA to verify the accuracy of a State's declarations about the 
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Figure 3.10. Extracts from the full scenes ovar Baghdad acquired by the Russian KVR-1000 sensor (top) on 27 
June 1990 (before the GulfWar) and the French SPOT satellite (Iower image) on 12 May 1991. (a) is the site of 
the EMIS machine housing; (b) an un-identifiad building which appears to have changed in 1991 (see the lower 
SPOT image); and similarly changes have occurred at c. 
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Fi ure 3.11. A map of the Al T armiya is superimposed over ~he extracts from the fun scenes from Russian KV-1~O (top) sensor image and the French SPOT (below) satelhtes. 
3.2 Israelis Dimona reactor complex 
In 1957 France agreed to supply Israel a nuclear reactor and a chemical facility for the separation 
of plutonium from the irradiated fuel in the reactor.24 The site for the reactor was some 15km south-east 
of the town of Dimona in the Negev desert (see Figure 3.12). Although the existence of the facility 
became known publicly in December 1960, it was probably detected in 1958 by a US U-2 
reconnaissance aircraft,25 An agreement between the atomic energy organisations of the two countries 
(the head of the Atomic Energy Commissfon from 1951 to 1970), an in (London), 5 October 1986. 
LSSI)6ctor The Undeclared Bomb, (Balllnger Publishing Company, Cambridge, p.170. 
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was signed on 17 September 1956.26 Officially France was to deliver its EL-3 experimental reactor to 
Israel. This is a tank-type reactor fuelled with 1.35 per cent enriched uranium and cooled and 
moderated by heavy water. The reactor, with a nominal power of 15 MWth, was designed for 
fundamental research, structural materials testing and isotope productionP 
Figure 3.2. A full SPOT panchromatic scene over the Dimona reactor complex and its environment; (1) 
Beersheba; (2) Military airfield north west of the Dimona reactor complex; (3) a large ammunition storage site 
with possibly nuclear weapons; (4) Dimona reactor complex; (5) possible phosphate mining areas, both linked by 
rail and road to the Dimona complex; (6) military airfield south west of the Dimona reactor complex; (7) there are 
two possible air defence sites; and (8) town of Dimona. Scale: 1 :250,000. 
Source: CNES/SPOT; image processed at the Defence Research Agency, Famborough, UK. 
The Dimona reactor, IRR-2, is a heavy-water moderated natural-uranium reactor upgraded to 
operate at 40-70 MWth.28 The IRR-2 may be similar to the French G-1 plutonium production plant at 
Marcoule. This is a natural uranium, graphite moderated, air cooled 38 MWth reactor.29 The dimensions 
of the G-1 reactor together with its shield are 14m length, 24m wide and 18m high. An enlargement of 
26lbid. 
27Directory of Research Reactors, val. 11, 1989, (IAEA, Vienna), 
Les Deux Bomber, Paris, 1981). 
29Directory of Nuclear Reactors, vol.IV, (IAEA, Vienna), pp. 177·182. 
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the reactor complex is shown in Figure 3.13 in which the reactor is reported to be at A.30 However, the 
dome of the reactor building is not very clear. Since the reactor is not apower reactor, the heat carried 
away by the air coolant is not used to drive turbines. Thus, it must be dissipated in some way so that 
some of this heat must escape to the atmosphere. This would be detected by a Landsat type satellite in 
the thermal band. In Figure 3.14 a small pond can be seen at H just outside the outer perimeter fence. 
The function of this is not clear from the panchromatic SPOT image. 
Plutonium is separated from irradiated fuel elements by chemical means. A plutonium separation 
plant, completed by about 1966, is buHt underground in the reactor complex. 
Figure 3.3. Enlarged Oimona reactor complex in which the possible reaetor site and the plutonium separation 
plants are at (A) and (8) respeetively. A fuel fabrication plant may be located at (C). A possible underground 
storage facility is loeated at (0). Seale 1 :28,350. 
Source: CNES/SPOT; image proeessed at the Oefenee Research Ageney, Famborough, UK. 
Network, Stockholm, -""'''''". private communications. 
POSSIBLE ApPLICATIONS OF COMMERCIAL SATELLITE IMAGERY FOR INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS 27 
Figu~e 3.4. An enlarged sectio~s (4) and (5) of Figure 3.12 showing the Dimona reactor complex (A) and the 
posslble northern phosphate mine (8). The town of Dimona (C) can also be seen to the left of the Dimona 
~h~ security .fences (0, E, & F) protecting the reactor complex are clearly visible and marked in black. A road (G) 
hnktng the mine and the reactor facility can also be seen clearly. Scale: 1:85,000. 
Source: CNES/SPOT; image processed at the Defence Research Agency, Famborough, UK. 
The plutonium production rate has been some 40kg per year.31 Generally plutonium extraction 
plants are long buildings. It is possible that the building at B in Figure 3.13 may be such a plant. 
The critical element in a nuclear fuel cycle is uranium. Israel has acquired this by various means. 
Its indigenous source is from phosphate mines in the Negev desert near Beersheba.32 In Figure 3.12, 
two mining areas at (5) are identified. An enlarged section of the reactor complex and the northem mine 
are shown in Figure 3.14. It can be seen that the mine is linked to the town of Dimona (at C) by road 
and rail. The road also leads to the northern part of the reactor complex and to a long building (C in 
Figure 3.13) wh ich may be where the fuel for the reactor is produced. The building is 140m long and 
40mwide. 
Covert facilities are generally very heavily secured by perimeter fences. The Dimona reactor 
complex is no exception. In fact three such fences can be seen in Figure 3.14. The outer most ring is a 
double fence. It may be argued that an ordinary industrial complex mayaiso have perimeter fences as 
a defence against, for example, un-authorised intruders or terrorists, obviously a danger in this area. 
However, the use of three fences would indicate a possible high value facility. In addition to these, at E 
chevron like scars or planted trees can be seen. These may be planted for additional protection from 
any observers of the complex from the roads on the north and north-westem sides of the reactor 
complex. A closer examination of the image in Figure 3.12 shows active defences, such as anti-aircraft 
31/bid, Perrin. 
32lbid, Sooctor. D. 191. 
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guns or missiles, Two possible anti-aircraft defence sites have been identified at (7) in Figure 3.12. 
Moreover, two very large military airfields are situated to the north and the south of reactor complex, 
which may weil act as further active defences, although this may not be the only purpose for these 
airfields. In Figure 3.15, enlarged section 6 in Figure 3.12 shows one of these airfields. A conventional 
ammunition and a possible nuclear weapons storage sites can also be identified at A. 
Figura 3.5. An enlarged section (6) of Figure 3.12 shows the second southern military airfield. At A, a possible 
explosive or nuclear weapons storage area can be seen. Scale 1 :28,350. 
CNES/SPOT; image processed at the Defence Research Agency, Farnborough, UK. 
Often near such nuclear facilities high ex 10 . 
not appear to be the case for the Dimona s't p H slves and or nuclear weapons are stored. This does 
(area 3 in Figure 3.12) in the mountains a ~:. e :wever, .t? the north w~st of the complex some 25km 
that some nuclear weapons may be stored herg T~m.umtlon ~torage slte was detected. It is possible 
re. IS IS seen In the enlarged section in Figure 3.16 at 
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A. The bunkers, that may be housing nuclear weapons are widely spaced compared to those at B. Also 
the whole area IS bounded bya security fence. 
Figure 3.6. Enlarged seetion (3) of Figure 3.12 shows the large eonventional ammunition storage at with 
possible nuelear weapons storage area at (A). Seale 1 :28,250. 
Souree: CNES/SPOT; image proeessed at the Defenee Research Ageney, Famborough, UK. 
3.3 Pakistani nuclear facilities 
Pakistanis sole known souree of unsafeguarded fissile material is trom uranium enriehment plant 
at Kahuta. The first prototype centrifuges were manufactured at Sihala where blue prints for the 
construetion of the Kahuta plant were also made. 
Whilst the pilot centrifuge began operating in about 1979 at Sihala, it was not until1984 that 
first batch of partially enriehed uranium was produced. High enriehment of uranium was achieved in 
1986.33 It is reported that there are between 1,000 and 14,000 centrifuges, which produced about 
100kg of the highly enriehed uranium by early 1988.34 The production rate is reported to for two to 
three bombs per year.35 However, Pakistan recently stated that Kahuta plant not 
been produeing highly enriehed uranium for some time and there are no plans to do so 
33 "Scientist Affirms Pakistan Capable of Enrichment, Weapons , l'IIaW'a-i-~''1am 
(translated in Joint PUblication Research Service/Nuclear Proliferation and DevisiolJlmenl 
""""',,,,,.,,. Alan Cranston, "Nuclear Proliferation and National , Congressional Record, 
p.S7901; and "Inside Kahuta", Foreign Report, 1 May 1986. 
35Nuclear Weapons and South Asian Securlty, Report by the Camegle Task Force on Non-Proliferation and South 
Asian Security (Washington, n.c., Carnegie Endowment for international Peace, 1988). 
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The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission's main research centre is at Pakistan Institute of Nuclear 
Science and Technology (PINSTECH) at Nelore in Islamabad. This is located at (1) just outside 
Islamabad as shown in Figure 3.17 in an image acquired from a Russian satellite in April 1991. An 
experimental reprocessing plant has been developed at PINSTECH (see Figure 3.18). Another facility 
at Chashma is capable of reprocessing 100,000 kg/a of spent fuel. In the Dera Ghazi Khan area, 
mining for uranium is being carried out. Also at this site, uranium is converted to uranium hexafluoride 
for enrichment process. The capacity is just over 190,000 kg of hexafluoride per year.36 The Atomic 
Research Reactor facility in the Kahuta area is detected at (1) in Figure 3.17 and enlarged in Figure 
3.18. The geographicallocation of this site computed from the SPOT image is 330 39' 7" north and 73° 
15' 30" east. The image in Figure 3.18 was compared with that obtained from a SPOT image. As 
expected, the two metre (photographic) resolution reveals considerable details. For example, buildings 
at the complex Aare resolved in Figure 3.18. As this complex has a strong perimeter fence, it is 
possible that the experimental reprocessing plant mentioned above may be located here. Also, 
individual bunkers in the ammunition storage area are resolved. The road C out of the Research 
Reactor Centre leads to adam, north-east of this site, (2) in Figure 3.17. 
Finally, Pakistan has only one commercial nuclear power plant, the 125MWe KANUPP (Karachi 
Nuclear Power Project) reactor near Karachi. It also has two small research reactors, Pakistan 
Research Reactor, PARR-1 and PARR-2. Both these are under the IAEA safeguards. 
The two images over Islamabad were acquired at two different resolutions; 10m (pixel) SPOT 
satellite and about 1m (equivalent pixel) Russian KVR-1000 sensor with the hope of detecting 
Pakistan's enrichment activities in the Kahuta area. The present analysis indicates that the Kahuta 
enrichment facility is not covered by either of these two images. However, the Russian image reveals 
many details on the defence related activities south of the Atomic Research Reactor. It can be seen 
from Figure 3.18 that the PINSTECH complex has a perimeter fence. Pakistan's enrichment plant, not 
in either of the two images analysed, is located to the south-east of the Research Reactor Centre 
~omplex. ~t a first glance, the security round these facilities seems very light. However, the Russian 
Image, wh Ich covers larger area south of Islamabad, revealed a military airport at (3) south-west of the 
Research Reactor complex in Figure 3.18. Moreover, to the south of this a surface-to-air missile site 
was also detected at (4). 
36Weissman and Krosney, The Islamic Bomb (Ne Y rk' T' 
, wo. Imes Books, 1981), pp. 81, 219. 
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Figure 3.7. The full panchromatic scene over lslamabad (A) acquired bya Russian satellite in April 1991 where 
PINSTECH and Pakistan's Atomic Research Reactor near Kahuta area are located at (1); a large dam at (2); a 
military airfield at (3); and a missile site at (4) can also be detected. Scale: 1 :220,000. 
Source: Transasia, UK. 
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Figure 3.8. An enlarged section (1) from Figure 3.17 showing the Atomic Research Reactor facility. Buildings at 
the am munition storage areas at (B) are seen more clearly than those in a SPOT image. Also the sites 
at (A) and (0) have perimeter fences indicating a sensitive area. Scale: 1 :20,000 
Transasia, UK. 
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3.4 The DPRK's nuclear facilities 
On 4 May 1992, the DPRK in its initial report to the IAEA submitted a list of nuclear facilities and 
material that would come under the IAEA's safeguards. These are summarised below 37. 
There are four locations where some of the important facilities are situated or are under 
construction. These are: 
1. PYONGYANG: 
• where a Soviet supplied IRT pool type 8MWth research reactor is located; it is fuelled with 
80% enriched uranium supplied by the former USSR; it is used for isotope production, neutron 
scattering experiment, neutron radiography, nuclear chemistry and for training purposes. The 
facility, under the IAEA safeguards, measures 6 x 10 x 10m high and it has been in operation 
since 196538; 
• hot cells, supplied by the former USSR, are also located at the Institute of Nuclear Physics, 
Kim 11 Sung University; they were supplied during 1960s or 1970s; pilot studies on 239PU 
separation have been carried out;39 
2. YONGBYON where at least three important facilities are located: 
• 5MWe experimental gas-graphite reactor in operation since 1985 or 1986; capable of 
producing some 4 to 7kg of 239PU per annum; 
• a larger 50MWe reactor, capable of producing some 40 to 60kg of 239PU per annum, has been 
under construction; 
• a fuel fabrication plant; 
• a reprocessing plant, some 180m long and six stories high, appears to be completed;40 
• Soviet supplied 0.1 MW critical assembly. 
3. TAECHON, PAKCHON, & PYONGSAN: 
• a 200MWe power plant is under construction expected to be completed in 1996; this could 
produce some 160-200kg/a 239pU; each site has uranium mine and uranium concentrate plant; 
and 
4. SHINPO: 
• proposed site for three 635MWe power reactors. 
371AEA Newsbriefs, vol. 7, no. 3(55), June/July 1992, p.3. 
38IAEA Directory of Nuclear Research Reactors, 1989, pp. 100-101. 
39Albright, D., and Hibbs, M., "North Korea's plutonium puzzle", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1992, pp. 36-
40. 
4Olbid. 
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It ean be seen that the major nuclear faeilities are at Yongbyon. It has been reported that DPRK 
has based the design of its nuelear power reaetors on that used for the Calder Hall reaetors in the UK.41 
The eooling water from the condenser is allowed to fall in a spray into a pond in the eooling tower. As 
the water falls it is eooled by the eurrent of air foreed up through the eooling tower by eonveetion. It 
may, therefore, be possible to deteet this in the Landsat image in the thermal band. 
Two images aequired over this area by the Freneh SPOT satellite were examined. These were a 
multispeetral image with 20m pixel resolution taken on 11 June 1986, and the other a panehromatie 
image with 10m pixel resolution taken on 19 September 1989. A Landsat 4 image of the same area 
was also acquired on 1 June 1992 in order to see whether it is possible to pin-point the loeation of the 
5MWe reaetor fram the deteetion of possible emission of heat or a eloud of eondensed air from the 
cooling tower of the reaetor. 
A panehromatie full seene over Yongbyon is shown in Figure 3.19 in whieh the town of Yongbyon is 
identified at Band the nuelear faeilities at A. Whilst no aetive defenees sueh as anti-aireraft gun or 
missile sites were found, three military airfields were identified at C, D and E. At F a large ammunition 
storage site was found. The equivalent area A in the SPOT multispeetral and panehramatie images was 
enlarged and are shown in Figures 3.20 and 3.21 respeetively. At these resolutions, it is diffieult to 
identify the nature of the faeilities in the area exeept to indieate that the area is isolated and some 
faeilities have seeurity fenees indicating the military nature of the aetivities. However, over the period 11 
June 1986 and 19 September 1989, the areas south and south-west of Yongbyon have been 
considerably developed. A more extensive road network has been laid and natural vegetation has been 
eleared around various sites for further development. The panehromatie image enabled deteetion of a 
possible railway line whieh links eomplexes A, C and E (Figure 3.21) from north-west eoming fram 
south of the site A, erassing the river before passing through the site C. In the 1986 image, site A is the 
O~ly one that is weil developed. Some eonstruetion had started at sites C, D, and E, while the ground at 
slte F had been prepared but little construetion had taken plaee (eompare Figures 3.20 and 3.21). 
41"North Korea's nuclear power programme r I d" NI' . 
3. evea e , uc ear Engmeenng International, July 1992, vol. 37, no. 456, pp.2-
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Figura 3.9. Full SPOT panchromatic scene over Yongbyon (8), North Korea. The nuclear facility is identified at 
(A) and three military airfield are at (C), (D) and (E). At (F) a large ammunition storage area was identified. The 
image was acquired on 19 September 1989. Scale: 1 :340,000 
Source: CNES/SPOT; image processed at the Defence Research Agency, Famborough, UK. 
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Figure 3.10. An equivalent area (A) in Figure 3.19 is enlarged from a SPOT multispectral acquired on 11 
June 1986 where band 1 is green, band 2 blue and band 3 is red. The Soviet supplied reactor may at (A). 
Area (8) is a residential area. See the text for sites (C), (D), (E), and (F). 1 :45,000 
Source: CNES/SPOT; image processed at the Defence Research Agency, Famborough, UK. 
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Figure 3.11. Enlarged section (A) from Figure 3.19. Comparing with Figure 3.20, it can be seen that considerable 
development has taken place between 11 June 1986 and 19 September 1989. For various sites, see the text 
Scale: 1 :28,300 
Source: CNES/SPOT; image processed at the Defence Research Agency, Famborough, UK. 
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Thus, it is reasonable to assurne that site A is where the Russian supplied research reactor and 
the sub-critical facilities are located. These facilities were acquired from Russia in 1965. It is the largest 
area within the complex divided into two by a road running north-west to south-east. The site on the 
right close to the river is divided into about seven sections each containing large buildings. This 
probably is the research area with the nuclear installations and some support facilities and 
administration buildings. The complex B to the left of the road may be the accommodation units 
arranged in rectangular pattern. The complex is linked to site F east side of the river by a possible rail 
bridge constructed between 1986 and 1989. An attempt was made to locate and determine the 
operational characteristics of the 5MWe reactor using the Landsat 4 thermal band. An enlarged section 
of the nuclear facility is shown in Figure 3.22 which is a combination of bands one (blue), two (green) 
and three (red). This shows that much of the area that was undeveloped in June 1986 is developed by 
1992. 
Radiation from various parts of a similar extract from the thermal band was examined. The image 
was unstretched in order to avoid changes in the pixel values. It was found that maximum response 
was obtained at 1 and 2 (Figure 3.22). This may be because the buildings are new and, therefore, 
reflecting light in the visible range of the electromagnetic spectrum. However, as this area was not 
developed in 1986, it is fair to assurne that the reactor cannot be located here because it did not 
become operational until some time in 1986 or 1987. The next intense responses were from areas 3, 4 
an 5 but these have been found to be bare land on the SPOT satellite's high resolution image. It is 
possible the land has been prepared for building constructions and foundation may have been laid. 
Other high spots were detected at 6 and 7. These buildings were constructed by 1986 so one of these 
may be the 5MWe reactor. The heat source may be a cooling tower. It should be remembered that the 
sensor on board the satellite measures the surface temperature only and not the body temperature. 
Also the software used, (IDRISI and Photoshop) convert the data in the thermal band into blackbody 
temperature. In order to obtain the real surface temperature it is necessary to apply a correcting factor 
given by the emissivity of the surface being sensed. In the present study this conversion has not been 
attempted. Nevertheless, the blackbody temperature measurements can be useful as relative values. 
The temperature values at 6 and 7 were 23.6°C and 24.4°C respectively. In this way temperatures of 
various other buildings in the complex were also determined. They were all found to have temperatures 
within the range 22.7±O.5°C. Clearly a high resolution image would clarify this. 
Another indicator of the operation of a reactor is the discharge of hot water into a nearby river or a 
~a~e. In t~e case of the Yongbyon complex, it is built on the west bank of the River Kuryong. Therefore, 
It IS ~osslble that some warm water from, for example, the turbine condenser, may be discharged into 
the nver. 
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Figure 3.12. A section fram a US landsat 4 multispectral image acquired on 1 June 1992 showing the North 
Korean nuclear compiex. The image is a combination of bands one (blue), two (green) and three (red). 
1:143,000 
Source: EOSAT/landsat; image pracessed at the Defence Research Agency, Famborough, UK. 
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An attempt was made to detect this in the river using the thermal band of the Landsat image. Using 
the band five, as it gave a very clear image (lack of atmospheric effects), a line was drawn on screen 
interactively through the middle of the river shown in Figure 3.22. This vector drawing was then 
transferred to the image from the thermal band and the corresponding pixels were examined for 
transmitted radiation. Different values of radiance were assigned different colours to generate a density 
sliced image shown in Figure 3.23. It can be seen that radiation emission is generally evenly 
distributed. In other words the colour distribution does not look very different at A in the vicinity of the 
nuclear complex, than that produced along the northern part of the river before it reaches the nuclear 
complex. 
One problem here is that the river is narrow with respect to the spatial resolution of the sensor. For 
example, at its maximum width is about 115m and it can be as narrow as some 60m. The resolution of 
the thermal band is 120m. Thus, considerable uncertainty can be introduced in the temperature 
measurements since a single pixel may or may not cover the water alone. Over the narrow parts of the 
river, it is possible that only half a pixel comes over the river and the other half will be over the land. The 
radiance in this case will be the result of an integrated response over the land as weil as over the river. 
It might be suggested that when temperature detection and measurements are involved, it might be 
more useful to acquire images at night local time or even to use radar (SAR). A second complicating 
factor is the varying depth of the river which may affect the thermal characteristics. In fact the SPOT 
panchromatic image indicated that the river is shallow in the region of the suspected reactor facility and 
becomes deep towards the southern part of the river. These factors make it difficult to interpret the 
thermal images when the operational characteristics of a facility are studied. It has been suggested that 
the "radiochemical laboratory" is located at C (Figure 3.21 ).42 The buildings here consist of four main 
rectangular blocks, the largest of which measures 120m x BOrn and several other smaller support-type 
buildings. There is little evidence for major expansion in this area. Resolution limitations preclude the 
identification of any security fences or other security measures. 
In the report of the Director General of the IAEA to the member states, it is stated that "it was 
essential to obtain access to, and take sampies from, two sites which the Secretariat has reason to 
believe are nuclear waste-related: 
1. The site which Agency officials had visited on 14 September 1992 and which was located east 
of the radiochemical Laboratory; and 
2. A site on the opposite side of the road from a nuclear waste storage site shown to Agency 
inspectors. "43 
42de Selding, P., "Photos indicate N.Korean growth in nuclear abTty" S N 
43lbid, INFCIRC/419, p. 5. 11 , pace ews, vol. 1, no. 9, 12-18 March 1990, pp.1 20. 
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Figure 3.13. The line represents the middle portion of 
thermal band along this line are represented in this I1m\ll/lnrt 
different colour. There are no signs of concentration an ..... ,,,,,,,,., 
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This may be referring to buildings on the eastern side of the road dividing the complex. While there 
are some large buildings here, they are not multi-storey ones (as suggested by lack of long shadows). 
Site 0 is east of site C separated by hills. Two large building dominate the centre of the site. The 
multi-storey buildings, as indicated by long shadows, are of "I" and reverse "L" shapes and are 
approximately 190m x 20m and 180m x 20m respectively. Their form suggests large administration or 
research buildings. Again, no security fencing can be identified. To the eastern side of the road, which 
bisects the site, are a further group of buildings that extend back into the natural vegetation on the 
hillside. 
It has been suggested that the 50MWe power plant is located in the southern part of the complex 
at A.44 The complex consists of five to six rectangular multi-storey buildings, with the largest to the 
south east and west of the site. Those in the south-east measure approximately 180m x 30m, whilst 
those in the west are 70m x 30m and 150m x 30m. The largest building might be a reactor as a 
possible water inlet and outlet run from the south-east corner of the complex to the open river. The inlet 
was not apparent in 1986 due to extensive sediment deposition on the meander. Either of the other two 
buildings may be the reprocessing plant under construction. The site has been considerably expanded 
since the 1986 image with a new internal grid pattern roadways. There is little evidence of an electricity 
transmission yard, pylons or other infrastructure associated with power generation, nor are there any 
signs of an active plant. 
Site at G in Figure 3.20 consists of a cluster of buildings to the north of the main complex on a hilI. 
It is linked to site F to the south by a road constructed after 1986. The purpose of this site in not clear. It 
may be some kind of observation post as the whole complex can be viewed from this site. 
The site F has grown to be the hub of the new road network. It probably controls the access to the 
wh oie complex. The site has remained at a similar size to the 1986 image. No major development has 
taken place. 
The above analysis indicates the usefulness of low resolution images for detecting changes in an 
area. Not only this but relatively low spectral resolution of the SPOT sensor (compared with the Landsat 
satellite) can be useful. 
3.5 Russian Kyshtym plutonium production complex 
In t~is sectio~ the ~ussia~ plut~nium production plants at a complex east of the town of Kyshtym in 
Chelyabmsk Pro~mce IS stu~led usmg two Landsat 5 TM images acquired on 1 August 1987 and 13 
May 1993. The slte, Chelyabmsk-65, formerly referred to as Chelyabinsk-40 is the first of the four sites 
whe~e the ~ussian plutonium has been produced. The other three facilities ~re at: (2) Dodonovo, on the 
Yemsey Rlver north-east of Krasnoyarsk in Siberia; (3) the "Siberian plant" is located near Troitsk or 
Tomsk; and (~) at Beloya.rskiy, near Sverdlovsk.45 Arecent Russian reference lists only three locations 
where plutOnium productlon plants are located. These are the Chelyabinsk-65 (the above mentioned 
44lbid, de Selding. 
45Cochran, T Bo, Arkin, W Mo, Norris, R So, and Sands J I N I W . 
1989, pp.79-83, (Natural Resources Defense Counc'I/H 0, UC& eR ar eap~ns Databook·Sovlet Nuclear Weapons, vollV, 
I arper OW, PUbhshers, New York)o 
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first facility) with five reactors, Tomsk-7 (number 3 mentioned above) with five reactors and 
Krasnoyarsk-26 (number 2 mentioned above) with three reactors.46 
The first plutonium production reactor (AV-1) at Chelyabinsk-65 achieved criticality in June 1948 
and produce plutonium for the first Soviet nuclear test in August 1949.47 This and four other reactors 
subsequently built at the Chelyabinsk-65 complex were graphite-moderated, natural-uranium-fuelled 
water cooled reactors. A fuel reprocessing plant with a capacity of 500tHM/a and a pilot vitrification 
plant were also built in the same complex.48 The former was built to reprocess fuel from the power 
reactors as weil as that from the propulsion reactors of ice-breakers and submarines.49 Water from the 
Lake Kyzyltash (see map in Figure 3.24) was used to cool the reactors. Between 1949 and 1950, 
storage tanks for the high level nuclear waste were built some 1.5km from the reprocessing plant. In 
1957 one of these tanks began to leak and in September 1957 the tank exploded causing wide spread 
contamination of the area.50 It has been reported that, since 1949 low and medium level waste has 
been discharged in the River Techa (see the map in Figure 3.24). By about 1955 or 1957 the river 
became so polluted that inhabitants some 150km downstream had to be evacuated and two dams, one 
of these can be seen in an extract of the Landsat image (Figure 3.25) of the area in Figure 3.24, and 
artificial reservoirs were built to stop the flow of the river. Despite the fact that the Lake Kyzyltash, the 
River Techa and the reservoirs were heavily polluted, the water from them continued to be used for 
cooling the reactors,51 
Figure 3.25 shows a false colour combination of bands 2 (red), 3 (blue) and 4 (red) of the 1993 
Landsat image with the main features of the Chelyabinsk facilities interpreted. Complex 1, south of the 
Lake Kyzyltash appears to be the site of the early reactors. The site of the new reactors is shown as 
complex 2, which is north of the reservoir constructed on the River T echa. The two sites are clearly 
linked by a road. Within complex 1 a large, long building can be detected due to its high reflectance 
properties in the visible bands of both Landsat images. A large area of deep shadow appears next to 
the building which indicates that it is considerably taller. The physical appearance of this building 
suggests that it may be a plutonium reprocessing plant. A number of other buildings can be 
distinguished within the complex but their roles are more difficult to interpret. However, there appears to 
be a feature which links complex 1 and Lake Kyzyltash which is possibly the route of cooling water 
pipelines. If this is the case, then the buildings where the pipelines originate may be the reactors. Within 
each of bands 1 to 4, there is evidence of a fence extending around the perimeter of the complex. A 
false-colour composite of bands 4,3 and 2 defines this feature more clearly. 
46Diakov Anatoly, "Plutonium", Nezavisimay Gazette, 12 May 1994. 
47/bid, Coehran et al. 
48Barker, K., "Reproeessing and HLW management in the USSR", Nuclear Engineering International, vol. 36, no. 440, 
Mareh 1991, p.42. " • 
49BibilashviIi, Yu. K., and Reshetnikov, F. G., "Russian nuclearfuel cycle ,IAEA Bulletin, 
vol. 35, no. 3, September 1993, pp. 28-33. 
soMedvedev, Z., "Bringing the skeleton out of the eloset", Nuclear Engineering International, vol. 35, no. 436, November 
1990, pp.26-32. 
51/bid. Medvedev. 
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Figure 3.14. Map showing the Chelyabinsk area. The nuclear complex studied is near Kyshtym. The area 
covered by the image is also indicated. 
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F~gure 3.15. Bands.2 (blue), 3 (green) and 4 (red) of Landsat TM multispectral image acquired on 13 May 1993 
wlth some features mterpreted. Scale: 1: 143,000 
Source: EOSAT/Landsat; image processed at the Defence Research Agency, Farnborough, UK. 
There is liüle evidence of any changes taking place within or around complex 1 between 1987 and 
1993. In contrast, at complex 2 a large number changes in the physical characteristics of the facility can 
be identified through differences between the 1987 and 1993 images, particularly in the visible and 
near-infrared bands. Such changes can be identified uSing these bands individually (e.g. Figure 3.26), 
but false-colour composites of bands 4, 3, and 2 for each date help to enhance the images for visual 
interpretation. The 1987 images appears to show a number of disturbed, un-vegetated surfaces within 
the complex, which are indicative of an early phase of construction. By 1993 the individual buildings 
within the complex can be more clearly identified and several areas and roadways which had formerly 
been used for construction activities now appear to be re-vegetated. One notable difference between 
the two dates is that in the 1987 image a feature can be clearly identified which links the complex with 
the reservoir. In the 1993 image there is no evidence of this feature in any band. It is suspected that 
this is a channel along which pipelines have been laid for transporting cooling water between the 
complex and the reservoir. Once installed, the pipelines have been covered over and the area re-
vegetated. Both the 1987 and 1993 images show evidence of a railway line extending north-east of 
complex 2. No railway fine appears to be associated with complex 1. 
In addition, the images show evidence of active defences such surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites 
and ammunition bunkers similar to those identified in images of Dimona and Baghdad nuclear sites. For 
example, two possible SAM sites are Iocated to the south of the reactor facility. A large missile field is 
found north of Kyshtym. Also there at least two military airfields located to the north-east and south-east 
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of the reactor complex. Moreover, to the east of this site a very large ammunition storage facility was 
found. 
In June 1989 two of the five reactors at Chelyabinsk-65 were shut-down and the remaining ones 
stopped their operations by November 1990,52 The thermal bands of the Landsat images were 
analysed in order to investigate the use of water from Lake Kyzltash and the artificial reservoir by the 
facilities for cooling purposes. Within IDRISI and the Photoshop the algorithms called Thermal and 
Black body respectively were used to convert the digital number values in band 6 of each image to 
black-body temperature values in degrees Celsius. The images shown in Figure 3.27 were created by 
using band 4 to create a mask which delineated the Lake Kyzyltash. This mask was then applied to the 
thermal images. In the 1987 thermal image, a plume of warm water can be clearly seen extending north 
for a considerable distance along the eastern fringes of Lake Kyzyltash. The surface temperature of the 
water within this plume is a maximum of 10°C warmer than the bulk of water in the lake. The plume of 
warm water enters the lake from behind a barrier constructed in the lake which, presumably, is used to 
separate the inlet and the outlet of the water used for the reactors. 
Figure 3.16. This shows the complex 2 in false colour composite of bands 1 (blue), 2 (green) and 3 (red) of 
Landsat TM multispectral image. The left image was acquired in 1987 and the one on the right in 1993. Scale: 
1:143,000 
Source: EOSAT/Landsat; image processed at the Defence Research Agency, Famborough, UK. 
If the plume of warm water ~s ~ discharge of cooling water effluent from complex 1 then it can be 
suggest~d that the reactors at thls slte were operating at the time of acquisition of the 1987 image. This 
obse~atl?n conflrms the reported operational status of this complex for this date. However, an 
examlnatlon of the 1993 thermal image of Lake Kyzyltash shows that the warm pi f ffI t t 
. t'll 'd t d'" . urne 0 e uen wa er 
IS S I eVI en, an It IS In fact larger In spatial extent and thermal magnitude, being a maximum of 150C 
warm~r th~n the bulk of water. Thus, contrary to some reports that the reactors at complex 1 ceased 
operation In November 1990, the imagery indicates that the facility was still in operation in May 1993. 
1., private oommunications, 
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However, this finding is in line with one recent report of the status of these reactors,53 The warm water 
is prabably resulting from the reactors which may still be producing electricity but not plutonium. Same 
cooling may still be required after shut down but perhaps not enough to account for these 
temperatures. 
It has been reported that at complex 2, the construction of three breeder reactors had started but 
this was halted in 1987 as a result of the Chernobyl accident,54 Nevertheless, the cooling water appears 
to be taken in fram the reservoir and the warm water is discharged into the reservoir also. This is 
evident by a barrier constructed to separate the inlet and the outlet of the water used for the reactors 
(Figure 3.25). 
The thermal properties of the reservoir adjacent to complex 2 were also examined using the 
thermal bands of the Landsat images. As in Lake Kyzyltash, a barrier has been constructed in the 
reservoir to separate inflow and outflow waters. Figure 3.28 shows the surface temperature variations 
within the reservoir in 1987 and 1993. These were created using the same masking procedures as in 
Figure 3.27. In the 1993 thermal image the surface temperature of discharged water to the right of the 
barrier is approximately 2°C higher than that of the water to the left of the barrier and in the middle of 
the reservoir. In contrast to the situation in Lake Kyzyltash, the plume of water which is warmer than the 
bulk of water in the reservoir does not extend beyond the confines of the barrier, but the area within the 
barrier is much larger than that within the barrier in Lake Kyzyltash. In the 1987 image there appears to 
be no difference in surface temperature between the bulk of the reservoir and the water within the 
barrier. Thus on the evidence fram the thermal imagery, complex 2 appears to be operating in May 
1993 but not in August 1987. The smaller temperature differential of the plume in 1993 suggests that a 
smaller reactor may be responsible for this effluent. This is in agreement with a suggestion that 
complex 2 contains a tritium praduction reactor rather than apower reactor or plutonium production 
plant,55 Lake Kyzyltash appears to be warmer than same of the others in the vicinity. This may be 
because of silting. One source of the water is from a small river which flows into the Lake Silach to the 
north of the Lake Kyzyltash. Lakes Silach, Irtyash and Kyzyltash are linked by small rivers. Because of 
the dams built on the River Techa after Lake Kyzyltash, it is suggested that the flow of water has 
stopped causing considerable amount of silting to occur in the Lake Kyzyltash making it shallow. This 
would affect the depth and thermal properties of the water. 
53World Nuclear Industry Handbook, 1994, p.34. .., 
54Ruokola E, and Vilkamo S., "All change at Chelyabinsk" Nuclear Engineering International, vol. 36, no. 438, January 
1991, p.18. 
55lbid, Sutyagin. 
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Figure 3.17. Band 6 of a Landsat TM multispectra! image showing the surface temperature variations of the Lake 
Kyzyltash in 1967 (Ieft) and 1993 (right). 
EOSAT/Landsat; image processed at the Defence Research Agency, Farnborough, UK 
Figura ~. ~8. Band 6 of a Landsat TM multispectral image showing the surface temperature variations of the 
reservoir In 1967 (Ieft) and 1993 (fight). 
Source: EOSAT/Landsat; image processed at the Defence Research Agency, Farnborough, UK 
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3.6 Sellafield complex in the UK 
Three images over the UK's main fuel reprocessing plant (the Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant -
THORP) at Sellafield, formerly known as Windseale, and electricity producing reactors at Calder Hall in 
Cumbria were examined. These were acquired by the French SPOT satellite in June 1986 
(multispectral) and again in March 1990 (panchromatic) and the US Landsat TM in February 1989. 
Sellafield is of considerable interest beeause a number of early plutonium and dual purpose plutonium 
and electricity production reactors were built in this area. The area is also being considered as a 
potential underground nuclear waste storage site. However, as was announced by Douglas Hurd, the 
then Foreign Secretary, at the NPT Review and Extension Conference held in New York in 1995, the 
production of plutonium by Calder Hall nuclear reactors for explosive purposes has ceased.56 
The proposal to build the Windscale site was announced in July 1947 and the work to develop the 
facilities began in September of the same year. Two reactors were built in late 1950 for the production 
of plutonium for the UK weapons programme. 80th were graphite-moderated air-cooled reactors. The 
reactor cores were cooled using a once-through forced air wh ich was then discharged through 137m 
chimneys with filters placed at their tops. The latter were used to prevent radioactive nuclides eseaping 
into the atmosphere. In October 1950, the first Windseale pile beeame critieal. A chemieal separation 
plant at Windscale was completed in April 1951. In the same month, the first pile began operation at 
normal power level and the second one beeame critieal in June. The latter plant was commissioned in 
October 1951. The chemieal separation plant took the first fuel for processing in January 1952. The two 
reactors were in operation until July 1958 when the first one was closed down followed by the second 
one only three months later in October. A prototype advanced gas-cooled reactor (AGR) was built at 
Windscale and commissioned in December 1962. It produced 28 MW of electricity and formed the basis 
of the future civil nuclear power programme. The AGR was shut down in April 1981.57 
However, considerable demand existed for plutonium for the UK weapons programme so that by 
1953 a generation of dual purpose reactors were designed at Harwell to produce plutonium as weil as 
electricity. 
The reactors, still in operation, are graphite-moderated and cooled by pressurised earbon dioxide. 
The hot gas from the reactor is first allowed to pass through a heat exchanger in which steam is 
produced. The latter is then used to drive the turbines to generate electricity. The cooled gas is then re-
circulated into the reactor core. The steam from the turbine exhausts is condensed by passing it over 
tubes through which cold water is flowing. In order that the resulting hot water ean be used again, it is 
taken to cooling towers to be cooled. It is interesting to note that the quantity of water circulating round 
a plant is about 150,000,000 gallons a day of which about 3,000,000 gallons are lost in evaporation. 
This has to be made up from rivers or other sources. 
The construction of the first two such reactors at Calder Hall site at Sellafield began in August 
1953. The first reactor became critieal in May 1956 and commenced its operation three months later in 
August. The Calder Hall 2 beeame critieal in 1957 and began to generate electricity in February 1957. 
The loeation of the Calder Hall 1 and 2 reactors are shown on a map in Figure 3.29 and their layout58 in 
56Statement made by the UK Foreign Secretary during the Non-Proliferation Treaty Reviewand Extension 
Conference, 18 April 1995, United Nations, New York. . 
51Windscale 1957. Anatomy of a nuclear accident, by Amold, Loma, 1992, (Macmlllan, 1992). 
58Calder Hall, by Jay, Kenneth, 1956, (Methuen & Co Ud., London, 1956). 
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Figure 3.30. In June 1954 adecision was taken to construct two more reactors at ~alder Hall t~ ~e~t 
the increasing demand for plutonium for defence use. Calder 3 began the productlon of electnclty In 
1958 and the fourth reactor began producing electricity in April 1959. These reactors are expected to 
continue to produce electricity through to 1999 when Calder Hall 4 may be shut down.59 
Figure 3.31 shows the full panchromatic scene acquired by the French SPOT satellite on .19 March 
1990 over the west coast of Cumberland in UK. From the map in Figure 3.29, the Sellafield slte can be 
confirmed at A in Figure 3.31. This is enlarged in Figure 3.32 in which the four Calder Hall reactors and 
the THORP reprocessing facilities can be seen clearly at [1] and [2] respectively. From the layout 
diagram of the Calder Hall facilities shown in Figure 3.30, the four cooling towers at (3), the four 
reactors at (4) and the two turbine houses at (5) can be identified in Figure 3.20. Using the aerial 
photograph shown in Figure 3.33, the three buildings (6), (7) and (8) in Figure 3.32 can be identified as 
the receipt and storage facility, the head end plant and the chemical separation plant respectively. The 
sites marked 9 and 10 in Figure 3.32 are probably the old reprocessing facility and cooling ponds 
respectively for the spent fuel from the Calder Hall reactors. 
While the SPOT multispectral sensor has a lower spatial resolution (20m pixel), a multispectral 
image acquired on 30 June 1986 over the Sellafield area was used to see the extent of development 
that took place between 1986 and 1990. The image of Figure 3.32 was combined with the multispectral 
image of the same area (Figure 3.34). While several smaller changes can be detected, the large 
development that occurred between June 1986 and March 1990 can be clearly seen at (1) and (2) in 
Figure 3.34. More subtle changes can be detected by subtracting one image from the other. However, 
for this it is preferable to have images with the same resolution since in the case of images with 
different resolutions, inevitably re-sampling occurs which would change the original values of the pixels 
in the re-sampled image. 
A false colour composite of bands 2 (blue), 3 (green) and 6 (red) is shown in Figure 3.35. This was 
to confirm that the canal joining the River Calder and the sea was not used to carry discharged water 
used for cooling the reactors. No hot water plum was detected at the outlet of the canal linking the sea 
but some water vapour from the four cooling towers can be easily seen. This would suggest that at the 
time of the image on 10 February 1989 all the reactors were in operation. While, in the absence of hot 
water pi ums in the sea or lakes, this method is a useful one to detect whether a reactor is operating or 
not, it is not completely satisfactory. The water condensation from cooling towers depends on the 
atmospheric temperature. For example, condensation outside the towers is not visible in Figure 3.34 
because the SPOT multispectral image was acquired in the month of June when the atmospheric 
temperature is likely to be warmer. However, as the cooling towers are observed from vertically above, 
a bright signature over each of the towers is detected indicating that some condensation may be 
occurring inside the towers. This would suggest that the reactors are operating. As the image in Figure 
3.32 was acquired in March, some condensation is expected to occur. In the image it can be seen that 
around the top two towers, vapour condensation is occurring but not around the two lower ones; at 
least it appears to be considerably less in one of them (the upper tower). This may be either both the 
reactors are o~~rating at a lower power levels than normal or one of them (the upper reactor) has been 
shut down. Bntlsh Nuclear Fuels plc. (BNFL) confirmed the above interpretation of the status of the 
reactors in June 1986 and February 1989 and indicated that on 19 March 1990, the Calder Hall Reactor 
2 was shut down for refuelling. Thus, the above interpretation of events from the images is in 
reasonable agreement with what was happening on the ground. 
59World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1993, (Nuclear Engineering International, 1993). 
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Figure 3.19. Map ofthe Sellafield area and its surrounding. 
Source: Davies, A.w., "Deep geological disposal of radioactive waste - assessing the environmental impact", 
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Figure 3.20. The layout of the Calder Hall 1 and 2 reactors. 
Source: Ca/der Hall, by Jay, Kenneth, 1956, (Methuen & Co Ud., London, 1956). 
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Figure 3.21. Full SPOT panchromatic scene (March 1990) overthe Sellafield site in UK. The THORP 
reprocessing plant and the tour Calder Hall reactors are located at (A). Scale: 1 :233,830 
Source: CNES/SPOT; image processed at the Defence Research Agency, Famborough, UK. 
54 POSSIBLE ApPLICATIONS OF COMMERCIAL SATELLITE IMAGERY FOR INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS 
Figure 3.22. Enlarged section (A) of Figure 3.31 snows tne details oftne Calder Hall reactors (1) and tne THORP 
reprocessing plant complex at (2). Scale: 1 :17,000 
Souree: CNES/SPOT; image processed at the Defence Research Agency, Farnborough, UK. 
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Figure 3.23. An aerial photograph of the THORP reproeessing plant in UK. 
Souree: The Thermal Oxide Reproeessing Plant - THORP, British Nuelear Fuels pie 1992. 
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Flgure 3.24. This shows the same area as that in Figure 3.9 but as a combination of the SPOT multispectral and 
panchromatic images acquired on 30 June 1986 and 19 March 1990 respectively. In this way the changes taken 
oeNIeen June 1986 and March 1990 can be detected. These are indicated in red. Major developments at 
(1) and (2) can be seen. Scale: 1:17,000 
SQUiree: CN!:S/~;POiT: image processed at the Defence Research Agency, Famborough, UK. 
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Figure 3.25. A false colour composite of bands 2 (blue), 3 (green) and 6 (red) of a Landsat multispectral 
acquired on 10 February 1989 over the UK Sellafield site. This is an extract trom the full scene. 1:62,000 
Saume: EOSAT/Landsat image processed at the Defence Research Agency, Fambarough, UK. 
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3.7 Enrichment plant at Almelo in the Netherlands 
Research and development programmes on enrichment of uranium by centrifuge process were 
being pursued simultaneously in Germany, the Netherlands and in the UK: It was soon reco~nised .t~at 
considerable commonality existed in all the three processes. As the techmque showed promise, a JOint 
company, Urenco, was formed in March 1970 by the three under the Almelo Treaty. Ureneo was 
registered as a private limited company under English law on 31 August 1971 with three shareholders, 
BNFL pie, Ultra-Centrifuge Nederland NV (UCN) and Uranit GmbH. A sister company, Centec GmbH 
was also created in 1971 to hold, jointlyon behalf of all partners, the patents and other intellectual 
property of the participating companies. The Urenco organisation expanded in the 1970s with the 
establishment of partnerships to own and operate the enrichment plants. Initially, two enrichment plants 
were constructed, one at Capenhurst in the UK and the other at Almelo in the Netherlands. The latter 
was a joint Dutch/German facility. The third plant was built later at Gronau in Germany. The last two 
facilities are discussed below. 
Ureneo centrifuge plants are similar in construction and layout. Basically a plant consists of a T-
shaped building. The top horizontal bar of the "r consists of the UF6 feed, product and tail handling 
areas, the control room and the plant rooms for the centralised services of electrical power, 
refrigeration, cooling water and compressed air. The vertical bar of the 'T is a distribution corridor for 
the centralised services. It consists of such equipment as desublimers for primary product and tail 
collection, heat exchangers and cooling water pumps, and low voltage transformers associated with 
each of the cascade hall which are attached to the vertical bar of the 'T. With such a design, it is 
possible to add cascade halls as the demand increases. Generally the horizontal bar of the "r is about 
200m long and some 40m wide. The vertical portion can be about 200m wide and the length will 
depend on the number of centrifuges deployed. The design has also been adopted by Japan60 but not 
all enrichment plants are necessarily "r shaped. 
Almelo plant is located south-east of the town of Almelo some 25km from the Dutch-German 
border and less than 30km from Gronau, the site of the German facility. The initial pilot plant of nominal 
25 tSWU/a capacity began operating in 1972/73. While this facility is still operational, a commercial 
demonstration plant with a capacity of 200 tSWU/a was constructed and became operational in 1976. 
This is made of four units each of 50 tSWU/a capacity. The overall area of such a facility is about 100 x 
100 metres. 
A Landsat image over Almelo was acquired on 19 July 1992. The Almelo enrichment facility can be 
seen at (A) in the colour composite of bands 1 (blue), 2 (green) and 3 (red) shown in Figure 3.36. The 
size of the image (a quarter scene) was such that the German enrichment facility at Gronau is also in 
the same scene at (B). The locations of both the plants were determined first using such criteria as the 
presence of passive security fences, roads and railway lines. These were subsequently confirmed by 
acq.uiring openly available maps used for public relations by Urenco showing the locations of the two 
ennchment plants. For example, such a map for the Almelo plant is shown in Figure 3.37. Compare this 
with the sat~lIite image.of t.he facility shown in Figure 3.38. The shape of the boundary is very similar to 
that drawn In the map In Flgure 3.37. In this study the maps were scanned and digitised using an Agfa 
Arcus f1atbed scanner. While it has an optical resolution (horizontal x vertical) of 600 x 1200 dots per 
60 Heri~t, ':D., "Uranium enrichment by gas ~ntrifuge·, 1988, Nuclear Science and Technology, Re ort tor the 
Commlsslon otthe European Communitles, EUR 11486EN, p.37. P 
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inch (dpi), the maps were scanned at 300 dpi. The images were then copied on a CD-ROM using 
Kodak PCO 200 Writer. 
The next task was to check the above interpretation by superimposing a line drawing of the facility 
from the map on to the satellite image. Before this could be done it was necessary to correct the 
satellite image geometrically taking the map as a reference. The numbers on the map indicate the 
same features identified in the satellite image. These were then digitised and two vector files created 
using the IORISI programme. A "correspondence fill" was created which was then used to transform the 
satellite image to the same grid system as the map by re-sampling the image. The process consists of 
creating a new grid and a set of polynomial equations to describe the spatial mapping of data from the 
old grid into the new one. This task is performed by the software. The re-sampling options include a 
"nearest neighbour", and a "bilinear interpolation". The former was used in which the new grid value is 
the same as that in the nearest cell in the old grid. The geometrically corrected image of band 4 is 
shown in Figure 3.39. This band was chosen because features such as the canal, roads and the 
building were more pronounced as they appeared darker than other features. From the map in Figure 
3.37, the areas encompassing the enrichment facility and the buildings within it and roads and a railway 
line were drawn and new vector files created. These features were then superimposed over the satellite 
image as shown in Figure 3.39. While various features align reasonably weil, the method is very 
cumbersome. This is due to the limitation of the software. More sophisticated image processing 
programmes can perform such tasks more efficiently. Here, simple techniques are used to illustrate the 
concepts. 
An enlarged view of the Almelo plant is shown in Figure 3.38. Using the overlay of the line drawing 
created using the above method, so me interpretation of the Landsat image is attempted. The main 
buildings housing the centrifuges have been identified and their sizes determined from the overlay. 
These and roads and railway lines are indicated in Figure 3.38. It is interesting to note that even with 
the relatively poor resolution, the railway line and a large fence consisting of trees can be detected in 
the image. However, these do not become very obvious in any other band combinations. 
The building labelled "smaller enrichment plant" in Figure 3.38 measures about 120m x 120m. A 
large scale industrial plant with a capacity of about 850 tSWUla became operational by 1981. A typical 
1,000 tSWU/a capacity may be housed in a 260 x 165 metre building. The size of the larger of the two 
buildings labelled "Two enrichment plants" in Figure 3.38 measures about 270m x 270m. The pilot plant 
shown in Figure 3.38 as "demonstration enrichment plant" measures about 60m x 60m. These 
dimensions are consistent with the expected sizes of such facilities. 
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Figure 3.26. A multispectral Landsat 4 quarter scene over Almelo (A) and Gronau (8) enrichment facilities in 
in Germany respectively. Scale: 1:80,300. 
~urce: EOSAT/Landsat; image processed at the Defence Research Agency, Farnborough, UK. 
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Figure 3.27. A site map of the Urenco's Almelo facility. The numbers on the map indicate the locations of points 
used to digitise the map. These were also identical on the satellite images. 
Source: Urenco, UK. 
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Figure 3.28. Section (A) in Figure 3.36 is enlarged showing the Almelo facility. This is a false colour composite of 
bands 1 (blue), 3 (green) and 4 (red). Scale: 1 :80,300. 
VV\.AIIJ"'. EOSAT/Landsat; image processed atthe Defence Research Agency, Farnborough, UK. 
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Figure 3.29. The Almelo enrichment plant observed in band 4 of the Landsat 4 scene. The features 
boundary and the buildings, roads and the railway line are emphasised by Une drawing from the map. 
1:80,300. 
Source: EOSAT/Landsat; image processed at the Defence Research Agency, Famborough, UK. 
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Chilled air is used to cool various systems in the plant. The final heat rejeetion is aehieved via high 
capacity freon ehillers diseharging heat to the atmosphere via roof mounted air-eooled radiators. A 
typica11,000 tSWUla plant would dissipate about 15 MW of heat via roof-mounted air eooled radiators 
or a low-profile foreed draught cooling tower. 
The canal is very narrow so that it is not possible to deteet any thermal signature in band 6 due to 
the discharge of hot water, if any, from the faeilities. On the other hand, no thermal signature was 
deteeted over the buildings in band 6 either. It is possible that on 19 July 1992 none of the plants were 
working or more the likely reason may be the poor resolution of the thermal band. As noted above the 
temperature of the air discharged may be low and the ehimneys may be smalI. On the other hand a 
considerable amount of thermal radiation over the area marked A in Figure 3.38 was observed. It is 
difficult to be certain about the origin of this thermal radiation without ground information. 
3.8 Enrichment plant at Gronau in Germany 
At the beginning of 1991, some 39 per cent of Germany's eleetrie power requirement came from 
nuelear energy with a capacity of 22,390 MWe net. Most of the reaetors produeing this energy are 
fuelled with slightly enriehed uranium for whieh Germany is largely dependent on foreign sourees. 
Whilst it has hardly any indigenous uranium resourees, it has developed its own enriehment capa city 
within the tripartite Ureneo arrangement. An initial enriehment produetion faeility was built at Almelo in 
the 1970. By the end of 1970s, Germany deeided to build a faeility at Gronau, some 30 km east of 
Almelo (see Figure 3.36). 
The eonstruetion of the plant began in 1982. Operations began in 1985 under a lieenee for 400 
tSWUla. By 1987, 260 tSWUla was achieved. In 1991 Germany had reeeived approval to inerease the 
capacity of its enriehment plant up to 530 tSWUla. In 1994 the operating lieenee for 1,000 tSWUla was 
granted and the capacity raised to 590 tSWU/a. The ultimate goal after reaching the 1,000 tSWU/a in 
1998 is to aehieve a capacity of 1,800 tSWUla without eonstruetion of new buildings but employing 
more eentrifuges.61 
The area B in Figure 3.36 is enlarged and shown in Figure 3.40. With the aid of the site map 
(Figure 3.41), an interpretation is given in Figure 3.40. The size of the main enriehment building is as 
expeeted for a plant of capacity of 1,000 tSWUla. As before, band 4 of the Landsat image over the 
Gronau faeility was proeessed and the outline of the boundary of the faeility and some of the roads and 
a railway line obtained from the map are overlaid on the image in Figure 3.42. The identification of the 
enriehment building can now be made with eertainty. Again the thermal band was used to determine 
whether the enriehment plant was in operation. Whilst one or two pixels over the roof indicate slightly 
higher temperature than the rest of the roof, it is diffieult to be eertain that this represents the hot air 
from the faeility. 
61 Private communications, Urenco, Germany. 
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Flgure 3.40. Section (B) in Figure 3.36 is enlarged showing the Gronau enrichment facility. This is a colour 
composite of bands 1 (blue), 3 (green), and 4 (red). Scale: 1 :80,300. 
Source: EOSAT/Landsat; image processed at the Defence Research Agency, Famborough, UK 
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Figure 3.41. A site map of the Gronau facility. Again the numbers .on. the m~p i~dicate the locations of points 
used to digitise the map. These were also identified on t7he sateillte Image In Flgure 3.40. 
Source: Urenco, Germany. 
From the analysis of the two gas centrifuge plants, it can be seen that whilst there are no large 
power plants associated with such facilities, it is possible to detect railway tracks and the centrifuge 
plants could be recognised from their shapes and sizes. Perimeter fences are also detectable. It was 
difficult to be certain about any heat escaping from the roofs of the centrifuge buildings although there 
were some signs of escaping heat from the roof tops. However, this requires more rigorous analysis 
such as sophisticated image processing and study of images acquired at night. 
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Figure 3.42. The Gronau ennehment plant observed in band 4 of the Landsat 4 scene. The features 
boundary and the buildings, roads and the railway line are emphasised by Une drawing from the map. 
1:125,400. 
Source: EOSAT/Landsat; image proeessed at the Defenee Research Ageney, Famborough, UK. 
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3.9 Fuel fabrication plant at Hanau in Germany 
The Hanau fuel fabrication plant has been in operation since 1969 and current throughput is 600 
MtU/a. The plant has a capacity to process up to 1,200 tonnes/a of enriched uranium fuel rods. 
However, pellet production for these has been suspended since the middle of 1994. Instead the plant 
assembled fuel pins with pellets produced in the United States. The fuel fabrication plant has now 
ceased to produce fresh fue!. There is considerable uncertainty over using German plutonium to 
produce MOX fuel at Hanau. The utilities are more inclined to use fuel produced in France and the UK 
for this purpose. Although the Hanau plant had been 95 per cent completed, the production of MOX fuel 
has been abandoned. An earlier interest in converting the Russian plutonium from nuclear weapons did 
not materialise.lt is possible that the plant may now be decommissioned. 
Whilst, with the use of a map (Figure 3.44), it is possible to determine the presence and locations 
of buildings within the Hanau complex, their identification is not possible at the Landsat resolution. 
However, some interpretation is give in Figure 3.43 which is a false colour combination of bands 1 
(blue), 3 (green) and 4 (red). In Figure 3.45 the roads, railway line and the perimeter of the Hanau plant 
and outline of some of the buildings within it are overlaid on the satellite image (band 4) as before. 
Figure 3.43. The Hanau facility at A and its surrounding area are shown in this false colour composite of bands 1 
(blue), 3 (green) and 4 (red) of a Landsat multispectral image. Scale: 1 :142,900. 
Source: EOSAT/Landsat image processed at the Defence Research Agency, Farnborough, UK. 
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Figure 3.44. A site map of the Hanau facility. Again the numbers on the map indicate the locations of points used 
to digitise the map. These were also identified on the satellite image in Figure 3.43. 
70 POSSIBLE ApPLICATIONS OF COMMERCIAL SATELLITE IMAGERY FOR INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS 
Fi ure 3.45. The Hanau fuel fabrication plant observed in band 4 of th~ Lands~t 4 scene. The features such a~ th: boundary and the buildings, roads and the railway li ne are emphaslsed by hnes drawn from the map. Scale. 
1:125,400. 
Source: EOSAT/Landsat image processed at the Defence Research Agency, Farnborough, UK. 
It is often argued that observations from space are severely limited because large parts of the 
Earth could be covered by clouds. This was true until the concept of synthetic aperture radar (SAR) was 
developed. Thus, in the following two preliminary test cases, SAR images were acquired over two 
nuclear sites. Interpretation of SAR images is less easy compared with the optical images. This is 
particularly true when observations of events are made over water because factors such as the wave 
heights, wind speeds and nature of the cost Une all affect the water at the point of discharge. It is 
important to collect all such data when radar imagery is used routinely. In order to facilitate 
interpretation of the radar data in the present study, multispectral images from the French SPOT and 
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the U~ Landsat satelli~es were used. :he optical images were enhanced using the principal component 
analysIs (PCA) techm~ue. These will be discussed first. Two sites were selected: the Dungeness 
nuclear power reactor In the UK and the reactor complex in Kyshtym in Russia. 
3.10 Two nuclear facilities observed by optical and radar sensors 
The n~ed for d.ay and night and all weather capabilities of sensors to observe earth-bound objects 
gave conslderable Impetus to the development of the SAR technology. In an active radar, the antenna 
of the sensor emits a burst of radiation which is reflected from the target back to the antenna, which 
collects the radiation just as a lens does in an optical sensor. 
The returning radiation can be reflected from a diffuse, specular or a corner reflector. Thus, a SAR 
is sensitive to the geometrical characteristics of the surface of the object being monitored. It is also 
sensitive to its dielectric properties. Thus, for instance, a change in temperature of water in a lake or a 
river due to the discharge of cooling water, should alter the dielectric properties of water which in turn 
should show up in the returned radar beam. Moreover, the change in the surface structure caused by 
turbulence in water, for example, would also be detected in the returned radar beam. A number of SAR 
sensors are now in orbit operated by various countries. These are listed in Table 3.2. Wavelengths in 
terms of frequencies and equivalent bands are also given. 
From the Table it can be seen that the resolution62 of SAR sensors on board the current 
commercial satellites is better than that from the thermal sensor (120m pixel) on board the US Landsat 
satellite. 
62 The resolution of radar deteriorates as the distance between the antenna and the objects increases. This is because the 
beam fans out so that it is wider at greater distances. Moreover, the resolution is proportional to the beam width. Thus, two 
objects at the same range separated by a distance less than the beam width will not be resolved. The angu~ar width of the 
beam generated by the radar antenna is inversely proportional to the length of the antenna. However, the slze of the 
antenna wh ich can be carried by a satellite is limited thus limiting the resolution of the sensor. This problem is overcome in a 
SAR which has a relatively short antenna wh ich is made to behave like a very long one with a narrow beam. A long ~ntenn~ 
can be synthesised by taking advantage of the motion of the satellite in its orbit. As the spacecraft progre~ses along Its Orbit, 
the short antenna of its radar transmits pulses or radiation at regular intervals towards the earth-bound obJects. As the . 
satellite approach es an object, for example, the beam of the antenna falls upon, moves across and finally leaves the obJect. 
During this time, it reflects the microwave pulses received trom the radar antenna back to the antenna. Th~ greater the 
distance between the object and the antenna, the Ion ger the object remains ~n the beam. See~ trom the obJect, theref?re, 
the radar antenna appears much longer than it is and this apparent length will depend on the dlstance between the obJect 
and the real antenna. 
The effective length of an antenna is, therefore, proportional to the range of the object. Theoretically, the ~esolution for an 
unfocused SAR is r-1/2.;I(AR) where R is the slant range and A. is the wavelength. For a tocused ~AR Wlth ~n antenna?f 
length I, however, the theoretical resolution is given by r-1I2. Thus, in the latter system, the resoluti?n ofthe Imag~ remams 
almost the same at all ranges so that high resolution images of the surface of the Earth can be obtalned trom conslderable 
distances. 
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Table 3.2. Characteristics of so me radar satellites in orbit. 
ESA ESR-1&-2 5.3/C VV 26 28 35 
Japan JERS-1 1.3/L HH 18 18 44 
Canada Radarsat 5.3/C HH 9 to 100 9 to 100 3-24 
Russia Almaz 3.125/S HH 15-30 15 5-7 
USA SIR-C 1.28/L 5.3/C HH,W,vH HV 8-30 30 
Two sites, a UK Dungeness nuclear power reactor and a nuclear facility in Russia at Kyshtym were 
examined. The aim of the test is to see whether the warm water discharged into the a large body of 
water could be detected by radar sensor. The interpretation of radar imagery is complex because of the 
way in which a beam of radar interacts with object is very different than radiation in the visible part of 
the electromagnetic spectrum (see below). In order to facilitate the interpretation of radar images for the 
two case studies, images from optical sensors, the French SPOT and the US Landsat satellites, were 
also acquired. Therefore, in the following preliminary analysis one SPOT multispectral and six 
European ERS-2 radar satellite images over the Dungeness site and two US Landsat optical and one 
ERS-2 radar images over the Russian Kyshtym site were examined. 
The optical images were enhanced by the conventional as weil as the so called principal 
component analysis techniques. The general principle behind the latter is as folIows. Much of the 
information in multispectral images is redundant due to correlation between the spectral bands. A digital 
image is made up of many small equal areas or picture elements or pixels. Each pixel has a numerical 
value, a digital number, which represents the intensity of electromagnetic energy received by it. This 
energy is collected from an area projected by the pixel on the ground. If digital numbers for TM band 1 
are plotted, for example, against those of band 2, as in Figure 3.46(a), the data points are distributed in 
a narrow elongated band indicating that as the digital numbers increase for one band, they increase for 
the other band also. The largest number of digital points in the Figure are in the red band and the least 
numbers are in the pink area. The narrower the elongated band the stronger is the correlation between 
the data sets. There is a good correlation between these two bands. A similar distribution between 
bands 1 and 7 does not have such a narrow elongated shape (see Figure 3.46(b)) in which case the 
correlation has deteriorated indicating that there may be considerable redundancy between bands 1 
and 2. 
A straight line can be drawn through distributions along the longer dimension of the elongated 
Figure (Le. along the major axis) using the method of least squares. This line is called the first principal 
component of the data and its length is the first eigenvalue (see the Tables 3.3 and 3.4 in which the 
values in columns are the component eigenvalues and variances). The parameter describing the 
variation of the digital numbers in a single band around the mean value is known as the variance. It can 
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be seen from the Figure 3.46 that along the major axis of the distribution there is a spread of data fm 
the ~o bands. The par~m~ter whieh shows the extent of the spread along the line is known as th: 
eovananee of th~ first pnnelpal eomponent. A new co-ordinate system can be generated if thls Une is 
u~ed. as one aXls and a second one perpendieular to it. This second axis is known as the second 
pr~nelpal eompon~nt. Combi~ing the two bands in this way generates the first prine/pal component. In 
thlS way the covanance matnx of the entire scene, the prine/pal axes in feature space whieh account for 
the bulk of the varianee, can be determined (see Tables 3.3 and 3.4). The data are then projeeted 
along the first two or three of these axes, effeeting a dimensionality reduetion. 
Figura 3.46. The distribution of the digital numbers for the Landsat TM band 1 and band 2 (a) and band 1 and 








The UK Dungeness nue/ear power reaetor. The tuel in the early British nuclear was low 
enriehed uran/um contained in magnesium alloy cans, hence the name Magnox for readors. A 
development of the early Magnox reaetors is the advanced gas cooled reaetors (AGR), which use 
slightly enriehed uranium (2.3% uranium-235) contained in stainless steel containers. The AGRs tend to 
have smaller eores than those for the Magnox reaetors and they are operated at higher temOOn!ltureIS. 
They are more effieient giving a greater power output than Magnox of similar size. At Dungeness, on 
the south-east coast of the UK, there are two Magnox (Dungeness A 1 and A2) and two AGR 
(Dungeness B1 and B2) power stations. The Magnox A1 and A2, eaeh with the power output of 285 
MWe, went into operation in November 1965 and January 1966 respedively while the AGR B1 and 82, 
eaeh with the power output of 660 MWe, went into operation in April 1983 and January 1986 
respeetively. All the four reactors are gas cooled using pressurised carbon dioxide. 
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In these reactors, the hot gas from the reactor core is first allowed to pass through heat 
exchangers in which steam is produced which is then used to drive the turbines to generate electricity. 
The cooled C02 is then re-circulated into the reactor cores. The steam from the turbine exhausts is 
condensed by passing it over tubes through which cold water is flowing. The resultant warm water is 
discharged into the sea rather than being cooled in large cooling towers. 
In the following preliminary test case, a multispectral image acquired by the French SPOT satellite 
on 9 December 1986 and six SAR images acquired on 20 February, 30 April, 4 June, 9 July, 26 
November and 31 December 1996 by the European ERS-2 satellite over the Dungeness power 
reactors in the UK were examined. An extraet of an image aequired by the SPOT satellite is shown in 
Figure 3.47a. The reaetor site ean be identified at A. 
When the image was compared with a map of the area, a road and a railway line appear at B but 
these eould not be detected in the image. Using the ERDAS Imagine image processing software, 
prineipal component analysis (PCA) was performed. The resulting image, a combination of the three 
prineipal components, is shown in Figure 3.47b. The road and the railway line are now visible (B). Not 
only this but the airfield at C can be easily deteeted. On the northern side of the Dungeness peninsula, 
the sandy eoast line exposed at low tide can be seen. On the other hand, only parts of the coast line on 
the southem side can be seen. In the region of the power stations little sandy eoast line is exposed at 
low tide, suggesting that the region is covered with water even at low tides making the area suitable to 
diseharge reaetor eooling water into the sea. 
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Figure 3.47. An extract from a fun scene over the Dungeness power station in UK Th ' , 
the French SPOT t Il't 'th I ' . e Image was acqUired by 
sa eie usmg e mu tlspectral sensor (20m resolution): (a) shows tOO normal 1 (bi ) 
band 2 (green) and band 3 (red) combination; (b) shows the combination of the three principal componentsue , 
PC1(g), PC2{r) and PC3(b), 
Source: CNES/SPOT, 
In Figure 3.48 a, b, C, d, e and f are extracts trom full scenes of ERS-2 SAR ,mance 
Dungeness power stations. The bright signature at A in the case a is due 
complex. While individual readors can not be resolved, two distind blocks 
identified, each of wh ich may have the pairs of the Magnox and the AGR readors. If 
fram the reactors cause any turbulence on the sea surface, a bright signature might 
of the radar radiation would be scattered back to the antenna. However, if sea 
!ittle radar energy would reach the antenna resulting in a dark signature. The warm 
change the sea surface properties causing in changes in the wave patterns, 
the waves giving dark signatures on the satellite image. The other factors that may 
signature are the tides and wind speeds causing changes in wave patterns. In Figure 
low as evidenced by the broadening effect of the Dungeness peninsula. This can 
the optical images in Figure 3.47. On 20 February 1996, the Ude was Iow, as can 
3.48a and, since waves can be seen in the image, the winds rnay have been 
these effeds being present, it is difficult to interpret this radar Image. However, 
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complex there appears to be a small dark patch at C. It is possible that this is due to the warm water in 
which case it may be concluded that one or more reactors are in operation. The information on the 
status of the reactors was obtained from the operators and it was found that two of the four reactors 
were in operation. 
In Figure 3.48b, immediately below the reactor complex, a very dark plume can be seen spreading 
into the sea towards the north east round the Dungeness peninsula. The beach (B) on the northern part 
of the peninsula can not be seen in Figure 3.48b because of the high tide. In Figure 3.48c, again a 
similar dark warm water plume can be seen. In Figure 3.48d, the beach at B can be seen because of 
the low tide indicated by the tidal front. In this case the signature due to the discharged warm water is 
considerably smaller, barely distinguishable from the dark area lining the southern coast. On the other 
hand the plume seems to be larger in Figure 3.48e and the tide is also high as indicated by the 
submerged beach at B. There is no similar signature of a warm water plume at the reactor site in Figure 
3.48f, at least judged by the lack of dark response. There seems to be some bright signature originating 
in the vicinity of the reactor site spreading towards the east. If the dark signature is due to the 
discharged warm water from the reactors, then the images indicate that on 20 February only some 
reactors may be operating, on 30 April and 4 June perhaps all four reactors were in operation, while on 
9 July either all the reactors were in operation but at very low power or only some were in operation; 
again at low power. On 26 November, only some reactors were in operation as suggested by some 
increase in the discharged water. On 31 December all the systems may have been shut down because 
no dark plume can be detected. 
Thus, it was concluded that: (1) on 20 February not all the reactors were in operation; (2) on 30 
April and on 4 June possibly all reactors were working; (3) on 9 July some units were probably shut 
down as there was very little sign of warm water; (4) on 26 November more units were operating since 
the dark plume was increased in size; and (5) on 31 December again all units may have been shut 
down as there was no sign of the dark plume. Only some of these observations were confirmed from 
the data acquired from the reactor operators,63 In fact, for example, two units were operating on 20 
February and on 4 June, all were operating on 9 July, three out of four were in operation on 26 
November and on 31 December and only one was in operation on 30 April. 
63 Private communications. 
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Figure 3.48. Extracts fram four ERS-2 SAR images over Dungeness. 
Source: ESA. 
77 
A careful examination of the image in Figura 3.48f shows some bright signature originating near 
the reactor site. Assuming that the phenomenon is due to the discharged water, then it is surprising that 
the dark response was observed in the first three images. 
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The bright signature may have been caused by the ripples and waves on the sea surface which 
would reflect some of the radar radiation back to the radar antenna. The dark response in the first three 
images would suggest very calm and smooth surface indicating that discharged water is not causing 
any turbulence in the water. One would have expected very specular bright response, similar to the one 
seen from the bulk of the sea. Thus, the difference would have been because of the temperature 
differences. The temperature of the discharged water could be so me 10a G higher than that of the sea 
water. Even this may vary depending on the time of the year. This difference may be greater in winter 
than in summer months owing to the seasonal temperature changes in the sea water. The former three 
images suggest similar state of the sea surface; calm with perhaps small waves. The fact that in Figure 
3.48f very little difference can be detected between the water near the coast and that in the sea, except 
for some bright signature near the reactor site, and that in the main bulk of the sea would suggest that 
the discharged water is causing some turbulence and its temperature is different from that of the sea 
water. This would suggest that so me reactors are operating. Another interpretation may be that the sea 
is very rough and is masking, to a large extent, the effect of the warm water near the nuclear site. 
To some of the above factors that add to the uncertainty in radar image interpretation are, of 
course, the tides. From the standard Tables available for predicting tides, it was determined that on 20 
February, 3 April and on 4 June the satellite was above the reactor site so me two hours before high 
tide; on 9 July, some five hours after the high tide; on 26 November, just under one hour before the 
high tide; and on 31 December, about two hours after the low tide. From the June and November 
images (Figure 3.48c and 4.48e) it can be seen that the dark plume is pronounced when the satellite 
was above Dungeness close to and just before the high tide (that is, in coming tides). The minimum 
dark plume was observed on 9 July when the satellite came over the site some five hours after the high 
tide (that is, out going tides). Thus, the temperature effect may be more pronounced at high tides than 
in the case of falling tides. However, when the sea is rough, such as was probable on 31 December, 
the temperature effect may give a different signature. 
3.11 A Russian facility observed by optical and radar sensors 
Two landsat TM images were acquired over the Russian plutonium production plant at Kyshtym 
on 1 August 1987 and on 13 May 1993. Sections of the whole scenes were extracted and a 
combination of bands 6 (red), 2 (green) and 1 (blue) are shown in Figure 3.49a (1 August 1987) and 
Figure 3.49b (13 May 1993). The warm water (in red) discharged from nuclear facilities at Band C can 
be seen at A and 0 respectively only in Figure 3.49b. In Figure 3.49a the lack of warm water in the 
reservoir at 0 indicates that the facility at G was not operational on 1 August 1987. On the other hand 
the channel that links the large lake and the reservoir also appears red in Figure 3.49(b). This may be 
because the water used to flow from the large lake but when barrier were erected forming the reservoir, 
the flow of water stopped. This may have caused silt into the channel giving rise to shallow water which 
could easily become warm by the sun. Another reason may be because some of the warm water from 
the large lake may be leaking into the channel although none of it enters the reservoir probably 
because of the barriers at F. 
. ?ver the Russian plutonium ~roduction facility, using the ERDAS Image processing software, 
pnnclpal components were determlned. PGA was carried out using two landsat TM images acquired 
on 1 August 1987 and on 13 May 1993. Summaries of the variance matrix, the component eigenvalues, 
and the comp~nent 10~dings are given in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. By associating the first three principal 
components wlth the pnmary colours of a graphics display one can often generate a single image which 
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could account for more than 95 percent (Tables 3.3 and 3.4) of the information in the seven bands of a 
Landsat scene. The comparison clearly shows the radiometrie differences of the two images. A 
combination of the visible bands 1 (blue), 2 (green) and 3 (red) appears normal to the eyes. These are 
shown in Figures 3.50a and 3.51a for the two dates. The PCA was carried out on the first image and 
components 2 (green), 3 (red) and 7 (blue) were chosen and combined (see Figure 3.50b). Fram the 
Table 3.3 it can be seen that the component 2 consists of predominantly data from the TM infrared 
bands 4 and 5 and the component 3 is mainly from the thermal band 6. In order to get maximum data 
for the latter, component 7 was also used. While most of the data were in component 1, this was not 
used in order to obtain a better contrast between vegetation and man-made features such as roads and 
buildings. This is apparent from Figure 3.50b. Note that very little indication of discharged warm water 
fram the facility at C can be detected at D in the reservoir (see Figure 3.51b) while a considerable 
amount of warm water is being discharged in the lake at A trom the facilities at B. This is not surprising 
since the facility at C is still being built as evidenced by, for example, un-developed land at C and by 
what appears to be an open channel E linking the facility and the reservoir. 
Table 3.3. The Table shows standardised64 PCA on an image acquired on 01/08/1987 
Loading Ci " 02 .. ' .. ' ... '.'., •• «;3 .. "····.· .. ,' ... ' ... , ....• C4 ••.. CS C6 07 ,. ... ..', . ..' ... 
Ky87_1 0.844594 -0.466049 -0.187959 -0.081719 -0.152827 0.062107 0.015690 
Ky87_2 0.897117 -0.332282 -0.209734 -0.106445 0.166295 0.039510 -0.015140 
Ky87_3 0.923273 -.0338863 -0.065183 0.082743 -0.006711 -0.146355 0.013398 
Ky87_4 0.461376 0.819140 -0.307417 0.133694 0.036524 -0.038259 -0.031057 
Ky87_5 0.857738 0.488284 -0.007061 0.127429 0.029719 0.041976 0.083221 
Ky87_6 0.824486 0.116375 0.518862 -0.193044 -0.005382 -0.-12472 0.003121 
Ky87_7 0.957953 0.116790 0.132765 0.208427 -0.018910 0.040874 -0.074811 
%Va.riance ... "lO.24c, •. '.··· 
.. '.'.' •.• 
.19~70 .. "., ,~.s.t} . 2.00 . ...•. , .. ,., .. 0.77 0.46 0.20 
. . 
~ ..... 
. . . t th th the usual variance/covariance matrix. For the ~ In the standardised case, the correlation matrix IS use.d for In~u ra er;.n se all bands have equal weight while uno 
time series analysis it is more common to use standardlsed vanables. n IS ca , t . ht 
standardised variables, those bands with greater variance, usually the infra-red bands, will have a grea er welg . 
80 POSSIBLE ApPLICATIONS OF COMMERCIAL SATELLITE IMAGERY FOR INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS 
Table 3.4. The Table shows standardised PCA on an image acquired on 13/05/1993. 
Loading C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 
Ky93_1 0.916133 -0.361631 0.073808 0.093284 -0.123710 -0.021534 0.002543 
Ky93_2 0.940677 -0.318215 0.015901 0.036938 0.069783 0.084323 0.016191 
Ky93_3 0.969538 -0.206967 0.022989 -0.025654 0.095640 -0.080806 -0.016961 
Ky93_4 0.920084 0.066315 -0.379402 -0.059936 -0.028592 0.011789 -0.023577 
Ky93_5 0.963084 0.208581 0.019969 -.0156073 -0.014750 -0.016942 0.060875 
Ky93_6 0.875780 0.404471 0.011302 0.262549 0.017724 -0.004698 0.004191 
Ky93_7 0.935069 0.230120 0.230023 -0.128132 -0.021437 0.030304 -0.044619 
%Variance 86.85 7.70 2.91 . .. ·.1.77 0.44 ..... 0.22 .... 0.10 
. .. 
As these two Landsat images were acquired at different times of the year, to get visually similar 
images over the site, principal components 1 (green), 4 (red) and 5 (blue) were chosen for the analysis. 
The composite image is shown in Figure 3.51 b. Three striking differences are the positive indication of 
warm water being discharged into the reservoir at C, the site at C appears to be developed since there 
are regular roads and buildings, and the above mentioned channel at E linking the facility C and the 
reservoir is covered up suggesting its completion. Moreover, while physical changes such as roads and 
buildings are easily recognisable from the normal bands 1, 2 and 3 combination, different types of 
vegetation can not be easily seen in such an image. For example, old roads disappearing at 1 and the 
construction of a new one at 2 are easily detected from Figures 3.50a and 3.51a. Also, from Figures 
3.50b and 3.51 b, it can be seen that the PCA helps to differentiate between different types of 
vegetation and land use. It should be mentioned that there are other small lakes in this area which 
show red signatures (e.g. a lake below B in Figure 3.49b). This may be because the water may be 
shallow so that the water could be warmed up by the Sun. Also, as mentioned above, some of the body 
of water in this area has developed considerable amount of silt which may give rise to such strong red 
signatures. 
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Figure 3.49. This shows a combination of bands 6 (red), 2 (green) and 1 (blue) of the US Landsat TM images 
acquired on 1 August 1987 {al and on 13 May 1993 (b). At A and D in (b) the strong response in red colourfrom 
the thermal band indicates the warm water discharged from the main reactor complex at Band a new complex at 
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Figure 3.50. An extract from the full scene of a Landsat TM image acquired on 1 August 1 ~87 oV,er the Ru~sia,n 
nuclear facility at Kyshtym. (a) is a combination of bands 1 (blue), 2 (green) and 3 (red) whlle (b) IS a combtnatlon 
of principal components 7 (blue), 2 (green) and 3 (red), 
Source: EOSAT/Landsat 
A SAR image over the same area was acquired by the European ERS-1 radar satellite on 7 May 
1993 only six days before the acquisition of the second of the above two Landsat scene. An extract 
fram the whole scene is shown in Figure 3.52. The image was co-registered and corrected for size 
against the Landsat image of Figure 3.48 using ERDAS Imagine 8.265 image pracessing software. The 
SAR image was then combined with bands 2 (green) and 6 (blue) of the Landsat TM scene. Extracts of 
the lake A and the reservoir B were then made and enhanced separately using the Adobe Photoshop 
65 ERDAS Imagine, version 8.2 manufactured by Atlanta, Georgla, USA. 
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image processor .. Th~se ~re shown in Figure 3.53a and b. It can be seen that the bright signatures in 
red of the SAR comcide wlth those of the thermal band in blue. 
Figure 3.5~ .. An extract from the full scene of a Landsat TM image acquired on 13 May 1993 overthe Russ' nucl~ar.faclhty at Kyshtym. (a) is a combination of bands 1 (blue),2 (green) and 3 (red) while (b) is a combi~a;iO 
of pnnclpal components 5 (blue), 1 (green) and 4 (red). n 
Source: EOSAT/Landsat 
(b) 
While these examples are a positive indication of the use of a SAR for detecting warm water, more 
work is needed. 
It can be seen from the above analysis that images acquired from a satellite carrying a SAR sensor 
could be useful in safeguards applications. Indications are that the discharge of warm water from 
nuclear facilities into the sea or a lake could be detected by a SAR. At present this is not possible with 
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the optical thermal sensor if the discharge takes place into a river less than 120m wide. The only 
thermal sensor in orbit is that carried on board the Landsat 5 satellite with aresolution of 120m. 
Moreover, a SAR can also detect power lines which is a useful indicator of the nature of a reactor 
facility. 
Figure 3.52. An extract fram a full SAR scene acquired by the European ERS-1 satellite on 7 May 1993 shows 
some bright signatures at A and D, possibly due to the warm water discharged from the nuclear facilities at Band 
C. Scale: 1 :48,000 
Soume: ESA 
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Figure 3.53. This shows the lake and the reservoir only from Figures 3.49 and 3.52. Landsat thermal 6 
(blue) and band 2 (green) were combined with the SAR (red). The overlap of the thermal band (blue) the 
SAR (red) can be seen clearly. 
(a) (b) 
3.12 Gorleben, the German back end of the fuel cycle facilities 
An interim nuclear spent fuel storage plant was built near Gorleben (530 3'N, 11 0 21 'E) between 
1981 and 1983 and became operational in 1995. During the same period, an interim facility for storage 
of low-Ievel radioactive waste was also built in the same complex and became operational in 1984. By 
about 1996, buildings for a pilot conditioning facility were completed (Figure 3.54). This facility is 
expected to go into operation in 1999. In the vicinity, an exploratory mining operation is belng 
conducted (Figure 3.55) to determine the suitability of the salt dome for a final repository of high-level 
radioactive waste. This activity will continue until the year 2003. The excavated material is collected in 
the same area. 
Three Landsat TM images, acquired on 24 August 1984 (Figure 3.56a), 31 August 1989 
3.56b) and 21 August 1997 (Figure 3.56c) over the Gorleben sites, were examined detecting 
changes in the sites. A high-resolution image acquired by the Russia KVR-1000 sensor .r .......... 
was also used for the analysis. However, the date of acquisition of the image was 
66 Russian KVR-1000 
of about 
taken over Germany are now availiable on wilh 
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Figura 3.54. Plan of the interim storage and pilot conditioning facilities at Gorleben in Germany: (1) Storage hall 
for spent fuel transport and storage casks; (2) storage hall for waste drums; (3) rain water basin; (4) guardhouse; (5) 
administrative and social building; (6) workshop; (7) garage; (8) operations building; (9) fence; (10) pilot conditioning facility; 
(11) electricity supply; (12) utility building; (13) rain water basin. 
Figure 3.55. Gorleben exploratory mine: Plan of surface facilities: (1) Guardhouse 1; (2) we's changing rooms, 
central heating station; (3) office and social building; (4) shaft 1 of mine; (5) guardhouse 2; (6) shaft 2 of mine; (7) oil store; 
(8) transformer switch station; (9) explosive store; (10) dog kennels; (11) materiallequipment store; (12) fuel storage; (13) 
lodging sanitary container; (14) water pumping station; (15) electric transformer station; (16) splash water pumping station; 
(17) weather station. 
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Figure 3.56. Extracts from the Landsat TM images over Gorleben, shown as combinations of the nr'lr'!'-"""I 
components 1 (red), 2 (.gr~n) and 3 (blue) (a-c) and a high-resolution image acquired by the Russian KVR-1000 
sensor. The dates are mdlcated. 
(d) Date unknown 
In this section, three methods based upon linear transformations of landsat TM 
used to detect changes in the Gorleben sites. They will be briefly described here. (For information on 
the change detection pre·processing see Appendix 111, the mathematical description of following 
techniques is given in Appendix IV). 
Pr/ne/pal Component Analysis (PCA). The PCA is one technique to determine l"!.nS'lr1nA~ 
(see the earlier sections on Dungeness and Kyshtym). In this sedion, principal were 
generated using one band of the two images (bi-temporal): 
We consider abi-temporal feature-space tor a single spectral band with 
(Figure 3.57). A principal component establishes the first princlpaJ axis 
data variance. Temporally correlated pixels (no-change pixels) wililie along 
pixels (change pixels) will tend to lie above or below it. Thus the projection pixel 
to the first principal axis - i.e. the second princlpal components - are a measure of 
Mathematically, the principal components are determined by the eigenvectors tv\\I~rifl"'lI'tlI 
matrix and are obtained by a simple diagonalization. 
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Figure 3.57. Principal component analysis (PCA) 











Iterative Principal Component Analysis (IPCA). In order to determine the principle axes it is 
advisable to use only those pixels which do not represent changes. Wiemker et al.67 suggested an 
iterative algorithm in which the pixels determining the covariance matrix are weighted according to their 
probability of being no-change pixels. In the present study, a somewhat simpler procedure is applied: 
After the initial determination of the covariance matrix, those pixels with second principal components 
larger than three standard deviations are excluded from the sampie. Then the covariance matrix is re-
estimated and again diagonalized. This is repeated until the principal components no longer change. 
Multivariate Alteration Detection (MAD). Nielsen and Conradsen68 recently suggested a modified 
method wh ich essentially makes use of all multispectral components simultaneously. Their algorithm is 
based on canonical correlation analysis. Multispectral data taken at two times are transformed so that the 
first transformed components are maximally and the last components minimally correlated. The 
corresponding components are then subtracted from one another in order to detect changes. 
Mathematically the method involves the solution of a generalised eigenvalue problem and has the 
advantage of being invariant to linear scaling. The latter property makes it insensitive to differences in 
atmospheric conditions at the times of data collection. 
A technique known as the IHS Intensity, Hue, Saturation (IHS)-transformation with a high 
resolution image helps to visualise the change. Change detection in nuclear sites requires both the 
spectral resolution and a spatial resolution of a few metres. The currently available images (US Landsat 
TM multi-spectral and the Russian high-resolution), offer the possibility of merging such data. 
RGB (red, green, blue)-IHS transformation was carried out using the three bands of the Landsat 
TM analysis (three second principal components or three MAD components, for example). The intensity 
component was replaced by the high resolution KVR-1000 image. Finallya back-transformation of this 
IHS into the RGB colour system was carried out. 
67 Wiemker, R., Speck, A., Kulbach, D., Spitzer, H., and Johann B., "Unsupervised Robust Change Detection on Multispectral 
Imagery Using Spectral and Spatial Features", Proceedings of the Third International Airborne Remote Sensing 
Conference and Exhibition, Copenhagen, July 1997, vol. I, p. 640-647. 
68 A. Nielsen and K. Conradsen: "Multivariate Alteration Detection (MAD) in Multispectral, Bi-temporal Image Data: A New 
Approach to Change Detection Studies", IMM Technical Report No. 1997-11, Technical University of Denmark, 1997. 
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All changes were indicated in colours. Only those change pixels exceeding a threshold of a fixed 
number of standard deviations are shown. 
The results of the change detection are represented in Figure 3.58 and Figure 3.59. IPCA and 
MAD-Transformation show comparable results with regard to the following changes: 
1. Changes resulting from construction works on the interim storage area (in connection with the 
construction of the pilot conditioning facility). 
2. Changes resulting from the exploratory mine. 
3. Formation of the mining debris heap of removed overburden between 1984 and 1989. 
4. Construction of the pilot conditioning facility 
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Figura 3.58. Bi-temporal change detection for the Landsat TM extracts over Gorleben acquired on 24 August 
1989 and 31 August 1989, fused with a high resolution KVR-1000 image. a) PCA: Shown is the second principal 
component of the channels 5 (red), 4 (green) and 3 (blue) exceeding three standard deviations. b) IPCA: Shown 
is the second iterated principal component of the channels 5 (red), 4 (green) and 3 (blue) exceeding three 
standard deviations. c) MAD: Combinations of the MAD Components 6 (red), 5 (green) and 4 (blue) exceeding 
five standard deviations. 
(a) 
(b) 
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Figure 3.58. (continued) 
Figure 3.59. Bi-temporal change detection for the Landsat TM extracts over Gorleben acquired on 
and 21 August 1997, fused with a high resolution KVR-1000 image: Combinations ofthe MAD '"_"'"",, ...... 
(red), 5 (green) and 4 (blue) exceeding five standard deviations, 
With regard to the IAEA's safeguards procedures, it would help an tnSlJl9Wlln 
the inspections where, if any, changes in a site have taken place. 
informed the Agency of such changes. On the other hand! if the Agency is 
the State for explanations for the changes and, if necessary, carry 
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4 CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, so me preliminary results are presented in which different sites were examined using 
commercially available satellite images. The sensors that recorded the multispectral data were sensitive 
to visible, near and far infrared (IR) and long-wavelength IR (thermal) and the panchromatic in the 
visible range of the electromagnetic spectrum. Several radar images were also examined to detect 
effects of warm water discharged in a lake, a reservoir and into the sea. 
For an undeclared nuclear facility examined the following can be said: 
a) Features such as passive defences Iike perimeter fences can be identified. 
b) Active defences like military airfields and surface-to-air-missile (SAM) sites can be observed. 
c) It is also possible to detect ammunition storage areas. 
d) Observations of facilities in the thermal IR region, when relatively large areas are involved, can 
be useful in determining the operational status of a facility. 
e) Undeclared sites tend to be in remote regions. 
~ Facilities are usually located near rivers, lakes or reservoirs. 
g) Images acquired over aperiod of time could be used to assess the development and 
operational characteristics of a facility by detecting changes in the images. 
h) Power lines associated with reactors producing electricity can be detected in images with good 
contrast. 
With the examined declared sites the following features were observable from space: 
a) Depending on the type of a reactor, it may be situated near a source of water supply or it may 
have large cooling towers associated with it; an example of the latter is agas cooled reactor. 
b) Images acquired over aperiod of time could be used to assess the development and 
operational characteristics of a facility by detecting changes in the images. 
c) The use of thermal IR images gives an indication of the operational status of a facility. 
d) The T -shaped building associated with some centrifuge enrichment facilities such as these at 
Almelo and Gronau, large buildings required for housing cooling ponds for spent fuel and 
reprocessing plants can be detected and recognised (however, all centrifuge facilities may not 
necessarily display the T-shaped building feature). 
e) Power Iines, associated with reactors generating electricity, can be detected when there is 
good contrast in an image. 
In order to determine the operational characteristics, cooling towers associated with reactors were 
observed using panchromatic and multispectral images. It was found that when the atmospheric 
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temperature was low, oondensation above and within the oooling towers occurred. This was easily 
detectable. On the other hand, during warmer weather, the absence of vapour condensation required 
looking into the cooling towers using thermal band of the Landsat satellite to determine the presence or 
absence of warm air and probably water. However, the usefulness of the thermal sensor on board the 
US Landsat satellite is limited if the cooling towers, rivers, lakes and reservoirs were smaller than 120 
m, the resolution of the sensor. 
It should be emphasised that observations from space should not be the only source of information 
for the IAEA to carry out its safeguards procedures. When it comes to detecting undeclared sites, 
analysis of information available from open sources, such as newspaper and journal articles, should be 
used to determine any indication of undeclared activities. A member state oould provide the IAEA 
information on certain undeclared nuclear facilities. Civil remote sensing satellite data can then be used 
not only to verify the veracity of all such information but also to determine the precise location and the 
nature of the observed nuclear facilities. There is also soope for deploying the technique to verify the 
consistency of information declared by States including the site boundaries and facilities adjacent to 
declared facilities. It could also be utilised in any future use of wide area environmental sampling, for 
example, to indicate regions of the world where undeclared activities oould not be performed above 
ground. 
Using so me of the above criteria, identification of certain nuclear plants may be possible. If 
necessary, this oould be followed bya request for on-site inspections. The Agency's inspection request 
could then be accompanied by data from civil remote sensing satellites that it has acquired and 
analysed. 
Finally, during the training period, the trainees need to keep an open mind and not be prejudiced 
by the experience they may have had of aerial or high resolution reoonnaissance satellite data. Whilst 
the data from civil remote sensing satellites are not as good, with a certain amount of innovation, they 
can still yield very useful information. Most important is the fact that such data are oommercially 
available. 
In the future, 1 m resolution will be available which is sufficient to detect relevant structures of 
undeclared facilities. 
Linear transformations (PCA, IPCA, MAD) were investigated to determine their usefulness in the 
detection of changes in a scene and as an aid to image interpretation. Following main oonclusions were 
drawn: 
1. Several ways of detecting changes on the ground were examined: 
a) Two panchromatic images taken at different times were compared to determine wh~t~er any 
changes had taken place on a site; while differences could be detected by examlOlng the 
images by eye, it was also found that a study of the reflectance properties of a section of the 
site could reveal whether any changes have occurred . 
. ,
b) In a multi-spectral image, the principal component analysis indicated that the technique is very 
useful for studying changes in the spectral characteristics of an image rather th~n the 
examination of physical shapes of objects on the ground. F~r example, the method .15. very 
useful for detecting small changes in temperature or changes In the spectral charactenstJcs of 
vegetation and other objects on the ground. 
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c) Linear transformations (principal component analysis, iterative principal component analysis 
and multivariate alteration detection) are very sensitive change detection techniques, giving 
indication as to where man-made changes may have taken place. 
d) Data fusion using the IHS transformation is a useful technique when a high resolution 
panchromatic image is combined with a low-resolution multi-spectral image, in order to 
facilitate interpretation. 
2. Radar images acquired over two sites, for which optical images were also available, indicated that 
radar could be a useful tool for detecting changes in temperature in water. This could give a day 
and night and all weather capability for monitoring nuclear activities of States, particularly those 
reactors that may be used to produce plutonium. 
3. Satellite imagery can be a very useful aid to inspection planning, in the evaluation of information 
(e.g. site map, status of closed down/decommissioned facilities or facilities under construction) 
provided by Member States. Moreover, it could also be useful in the assessment of other 
information available to the IAEA (e.g. from open sources), and that compiled from national 
technical means. 
4. As part of the Agency's safeguards procedures, if the wide area environmental sampling technique 
is shown to be technically feasible and cost-effective, then observation satellites could become an 
additional useful tool, for example, in determining where environmental monitoring measures might 
be implemented. In the case of Iraq, wide area sampling is carried out without the use of satellites. 
However, this is a unique case. In other Member States, in order to determine where sampling 
equipment should be deployed, the use of satellite observations may be a useful way to proceed or 
it may be the only way to proceed. 
The results of this study are encouraging. It was shown that current generation commercially available 
panchromatic images from satellites can detect and identify undeclared facilities. Nevertheless, more 
work needs to be done. For example, it is necessary to carry out an extensive examination in which 
power reactors such as Candu and Magnox types, dedicated plutonium production reactors, research 
reactors, enrichment and reprocessing facilities should be examined using panchromatic and 
multispectral images having both medium (5-10m) and high resolutions (1-2m). The use of stereoscopic 
images should be examined. This is because it is possible to extract more information from such data 
even at low resolution (such as 10m from SPOT or 6m from the Indian IRS-1C satellites) if stereoscopic 
images and computer enhancement is used. An improvement by a factor of -v2 could be obtained in 
effective resolution. Thus, an image from the Indian IRS-1C satellite, wh ich has aresolution of 5.8m, 
could have effective stereo image with aresolution of about 4m pixel. Moreover, stereo images facilitate 
measurements of the dimensions of objects being observed. Through such images, description of 
targets may become easier. Within the next one to three years, images with resolutions between one 
and three metres will become available. Such data should also be examined. 
Looking into the future, another question, which needs to be addressed j[l detail, is that of data 
transmission to the base ground receiving station from various commercial observation satellites. 
Although there are a number of commercial communications spacecraft in orbit at present, they are 
probably not able to handle the large data rates generated from observation satellites. It is possible that 
the operators of such satellites could incorporate improved facilities in their satellites so that they can 
transmit data from civil remote sensing satellites. 
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The ~ethod f~r detecting changes on the ground needs to be examined more closely using images 
taken at different times. It would be beneficial to examine more images over the sites analysed in this 
preliminary study. An important part of the study would be the use of radar sensors. As the 
interpretation of radar data is difficult, a considerable amount of work is needed in this area. Also with 
the imminent availability of higher resolution data than is currently available, the importance and 
usefulness of commercial satellite imagery for the IAEA will increase. 
Various image processing and interpretation techniques also need to be examined, Le. 
mathematical tools requiring software development. Apart from the geometrie correction, an accurate 
atmospheric correetion is essential for change detection. In order to minimise errors in the analysis, it is 
necessary to make use of atmospheric correction algorithms or to use change detection techniques 
with images taken at the same time of the day and during the same month of the years. Image 
classification is another procedure for change detection. Post-classification comparison analysis of two 
independently produced classified images with the view to detecting ehanges in the pixel classes 
between two dates minimises or bypasses the problems of geometrie and radiometrie differences 
between two dates. In multi-temporal classification, a combined data set of two or more dates can be 
analysed in supervised or unsupervised mode to identify changes. Classification algorithms for both 
applications are for example Fuzzy Clustering, Maximum Li kelihood, Neural Networks, as weil as 
combinations of them. Finally, details about the speetral signatures of the sites being examined, for 
example, radiometrie measurements on different building materials, would simplify the image 
interpretation. The commercial availability of such tools is very limited. Therefore, it is necessary to 
develop the appropriate software. 
From the safeguards point of view it is important to have a spectrum of tools available for image 
interpretation partieularly when non-compliance issues come up. The Agency needs to be absolutely 
certain that a non-compliance has occurred. 
The IAEA has perhaps five options to choose from: 
• not to adopt the use of civil satellite imagery; 
• to rely on the member states to acquire information from space and inform the Agency of any 
irregularities; 
• to create or utilise regional verification agencies similar to the Western European Union Satellite 
Centre (WSC); 
• to wait until an international verification agency is organised under the United Nations; 
• to acquire commercially available satellite images and undertake analysis in-house. (This could 
be triggered by other information, for example, as supplied by Member States or from 
information analysis.) 
The option of not using satellite image ries would ignore the potential benefits of t~e utili~ of such 
information. Reliance on information supplied by Member States has not worked sa~lsfactonly so far 
because of political problems and perceived vested nationa~ interests .. Ev~dence provlded to the IA~A 
on nuclear aetivities in DPRK aequired by observation sateliltes was dlsmlssed by the DPRK as bel~g 
fabricated intelligence information and exacerbated the difficulties being encou~ter~d by the .I~EA In 
attempting to confirrn the extent of DPRK's compliance with its NPT obhgations. Addltlonally, 
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dependence upon the provision of information from Member States can give rise to timeliness 
problems: for example, information on Iraq was made available to the IAEA too late. It is thus not 
politically sensible for the IAEA to be dependent entirely upon others to provide such information. 
The IAEA could request information from or contract the work out to the existing regional agencies, 
such as the WSC. There are other international treaties elsewhere which might provide the basis for 
possible satellite verification agencies. For example, in the South Pacific region the 1985 Treaty of 
Rarotonga is in force. 80th China and Russia have already signed the Protocols and France, the UK 
and the USA have announced their intentions to do the same. The IAEA is responsible for monitoring 
this Treaty under safeguards agreements with the Member States and a regional satellite capability 
might prove politically and technically valuable. Other important regions are Africa, the Middle East, the 
Indian Sub-continent and the Latin Americas. This option, however, is a medium term option: the 
necessary infrastructure does not exist and would take some time to put in place. The need to enhance 
IAEA safeguards exists now and it would be inappropriate not to utilise the potential offered by satellite 
imagery sooner rather than later. 
Similarly the fourth option of waiting for the creation of an international verification agency under 
the auspices of the United Nations is very laudable but is unlikely to be realised for some considerable 
time. Ultimately the adoption of such an option might be the most appropriate long term aim. Such a 
new Agency might also satisfy the needs of individual states as weil as those of the IAEA. 
For the immediate future this then leaves the fifth and final option - to acquire commercially 
available satellite images and undertake analysis in-house. This study has confirmed that: 
• there is significant potential in the application of the use of civil satellite imagery for safeguards; 
• this can be achieved at relatively modest cost (see Appendix V); 
• the transfer of the necessary technology into the IAEA does not present insuperable difficulties. 
The technology is also changing rapidly particularly with respect to the quality of commercially 
available data which will significantly enhance the value of deploying the technique. 
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APPENDIX 
I AVAILABILITY AND CAPABILITIES OF CIVIUCOMMERCIAL REMOTE 
SENSING SATELLITES 
11.1 Current civil remote sensing satellites and their capabilities 
At present seven countries - Canada, the PRC, France, India, Japan, Russia and the United 
States - launch and operate civil remote sensing satellites (see Table 1.1). The European Space Agency 
(ESA, a 15-nation consortium)69 joined these when the ERS-1 satellite was launched on 16 July 1991. 
Of these, only France and the USA have been actively distributing their satellite data on a commercial 
basis. These have now been joined by Canada, India, Japan and the Russian Federation. 
Table 1.1. Current civil remote sensing satellites. 
ESA ERS-1 16/07/1991 02105/1994 25-30 
ERS-2 25-30 
France SPOT-1 SPOT- 22/021198622/01/1990 10-20 2.5 days 4 
2 SPOT-3 26/0911993 10-20 2.5 days 4 
10-20 2.5 4 
India IRS-1A 17/03/198829/0811991 36-72 22 days 4 
IRS-18 15/10/1994 36-72 22 days 4 
IRS-P2 28/1211995 33-37 24 days 4 
IRS-1C 5.8-69 5 
Japan MOS-1 19/0211987 07/02/1990 50 17 days 4 
MOS-1 11/0211992 50 17 days 4 
JERS-1 18-24 44 1 
USA Landsat-4 16/07/198201/03/1984 30-120 16 days 7 
Landsat-5 30-120 16 7 
Russia KFA- Early 1980s 6m 14 days 2 
1000Almaz-1 31/0311990 15-30 1-3 days 1 radio-
10-30 km meter 
Under a commercial agreement, the data trom the Indian remote ~e~sing sateJlit~ (IR~) are 
received and marketed globally by the US EOSAT CO,?D Argentina, Brazll (In collaboratJon wlth the 
69Membership consists of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, ~orway, Spain, . 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom. Finland became an Associate ~ember in January 1981 and lies were forged Wlth 
Canada by virtue of an agreement signed in December 1981 and renewed In May 1989. 
70Annuai Report, 1994-95, Govemment of India, Department of Space. 
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PRC), Canada and Sweden have developed plans for such spacecraft. While Canada under its 
PaxsaF1 has carried out studies on satellite requirements for verification of arms control agreements 
and crisis monitoring and it is very active in the field, Sweden seems to have lost interest in its Tellus 
projecF2. Israellaunched two satellites on 19 September 1988 and 3 April 1990. The former may have 
been a first experimental surveillance spacecraft. The latter may have been an experimental satellite 
with two-way communications capability. It re-entered the earth's atmosphere on 7 September 1990. 
1.2 Satellite capabilities and orbits 
A satellite orbit is usually elliptical with the centre of the earth at one of the foci of the ellipse. There 
are six basic parameters, called the orbital elements, which completely describe the size, shape and 
orientation of an orbit of a satellite in space. Of these n, the right Ascension of the ascending node and 
(0, argument of perigee are relevant for the present discussion. The position of the orbital plane in 
space is usually given in a terrestrial sidereal rectangular co-ordinate system, the axes of which are 
shown in Figure 1.1. The origin, 0, of the co-ordinate system is the centre of the earth; the z-axis is 
oriented towards the North Pole and the earth's equatorial plane is in the xy-plane. The x-axis is 
oriented towards the Vernal equinox or the first point of AriesJ3 The point of intersection of the satellite 
ground track74 with the equator is known as the ascending node. In Figure 1.1, it is marked N. The angle 
n between the x-axis and line ON defines the right Ascension of the ascending node. During the 
lifetime of a satellite n does not remain fixed. This is because the orbital plane turns round the earth's 
axis while keeping the orbital inclination75 constant. The change in n is known as precession. This 
occurs because the earth is not spherical so that its centre of gravity is not at the same point as its 
centre of mass. Moreover, the mass is not uniformly distributed. For low altitude orbits with small orbital 
inclinations, i, the rate of change of n can be as much as 9° per day. However, for an orbital inclination 
of 90°, this is zero. Because of this, it is possible to compare, for a particular day, the orbital planes of 
various satellites. All the satellites considered here are in circular orbits with inclinations of about 90°. 
Such an orbit is called a polar orbit (see Figure 1.2). For observation satellites the change in n is used 
so that they pass over a region of interest on the earth at the same time of the day throughout the 
active lifetime of the satellite. Therefore, the reconnaissance photography always refers to the same 
local time so that changes in activity in the region can be compared from day to day. This is achieved 
by placing a satellite in a Sun-synchronous orbit in which the satellite is orbited with its orbital inclination 
of almost 90°. The plane of the satellite orbit contains both the earth and the Sun. In this type of orbit 
the satellite crosses, for example, the equator, at just about local noon on the sunlit side of the earth 
and local midnight on the dark side. The earth rotates under the satellite orbit, which is fixed in space, 
at a rate of 15° per hour, so that the equatorial and temperate zones of the earth can be photographed 
with the Sun always high in the sky. The orientation of the ellipse within the orbital plane of a satellite is 
given by (0, the second of the two orbital elements considered. It is the angle between the li ne ON (see 
Figure 1.1) in the equatorial plane and the line OP, where P is the perigee. The line OP always lies 
71PAXSAT Concept: The application of space-based remote sensing for arms control verification, Verification 
Brochure no. 2, 1987, (Published by the Department of External Affairs, Canada). 
72"Project Tellus -Technical study of a verification satellite", September 1988. 
73The orbital plane of the earth is called the plane of the ecliptic. The angle between the earth's equatorial plane and the 
ecliptic plane is 23
0 
T. The line of intersection of these two planes defines an important direction in space, known as the 
point of Aries. At any particular time this direction is exactly known and all celestial directions can conveniently be referred to 
it. 
74This is the projected path traced out by a satellite over the surface of the earth. 
75This is the angle between the orbital plane of the satellite and the equatorial plane of the earth. 
POSSIBLE ApPLICATIONS OF COMMERCIAL SATELLITE IMAGERY FOR INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS 99 
along the major axis of the ellipse. The oblateness of the earth also affects 0), which for all except one 
value of orbital inclination is not constant. This means that the major axis of the orbit rotates in the 
orbital plane in the direction of motion of the satellite. The rate of change of 0) is zero when the orbital 
inclination is 63.4°. Thus, a satellite launched at this orbital inclination, its perigee will remain stable 
along any chosen latitude. For other values of orbital inclination, 0) could vary up to SO per day. 
Figure 1.1. Geometry of a satellite orbit. 
z 
rbital plane of satellite 
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Figure 1.2. Circular sun-synchronous orbit of an observation satellite with an orbital inclination of between 97° 
and 101° 
For some of the satellites listed in Table 1.1, the relative positions of their orbital planes are 
indicated in Figure 1.3. It can be seen SPOT-1, -2, MOS-2, and ERS-1 are all in the same orbital plane. 
From this plane, the orbital plane separations of IRS-1B, MOS-1, Landsats 4 and -5, and IRS-1A are 
2°, 5°, 15°, and 28° respectively. The Landsat-4 and -5 are in the same plane. The numbers in 
brackets in Figure 1.3 are the perigee positions of all the satellites relative to the equator. The similarity 
of parameters for the two Landsat indicates that Landsat-5 was areplacement for Landsat-4. On the 
other hand the two IRS satellites are probably being used in order to obtain wider coverage. Their 
orbital planes are separated by 25.75°. The period of these satellites is 103.1 min so that, for example, 
during this time a point observed by IRS-1 B has moved under the orbit of IRS 1 A since the earth would 
have rotated by 25.78°. However, because of its different perigee position, the satellite will not observe 
the same object. 
Consider the constellation of all the nine satellites. As these are not launched to operate in 
collaboration with each other, their orbits are such that observations of the earth can not be made in 
any logical fashion. Nevertheless, an examination of the orbital parameters of these spacecraft 
indicates that they are not all in one orbital plane. They are also widely dispersed relatively to each 
other in their orbital planes. This means that a more frequent and wider coverage is still possible. While 
SPOT -2, -1, MOS-2 and ERS-1 are in the same orbital plane, their perigee positions, relatively to that of 
SPOT-2, are at 33.1°,30.1°, and 44.8° respectively. It is assumed here that the relative value of rofor 
all the satellites remains constant. This means that SPOT -1 could observe the same target in just over 
9 minutes of the SPOT-2leaving it. During this time the earth has rotated by just over two degrees. The 
ERS-1 would be over the target in 12.5 minutes du ring which time the earth would have rotated by 
about three degrees. This would still enable the satellites to observe the target with the radar sensor. 
With the Landsats and the IRS-1A being in different orbital planes, the target next comes under the 
orbits of these satellites so that the revisit time could be much less than those indicated in Table 1.1 if 
data from different satellites are used. Not only this but if in future the launches of such satellites are co-
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ordinafted in su~h a way that t~~ir orbital planes are spread out evenly, the revisit time can be improved 
t
ehven urther wlthout any additional satellites. Moreover, with some ten satellites evenly spread out 
ere would not be any need for additional satellites. ' 
Figure 1.3. Positions of the o~ital planes of so me of the remote sensing space craft relative to SPOT-2 observed 
on 23 August 1993. Numbers In brackets are perigee positions of satellites measured from the equator. 
x 
~------------~~-----------+- y 
SPOT-2 (0 deg) 
SPOT-l (J3 deg) 
MOS-2 (Jo deg) 
ERS-I (46 deg) 
IRS-IB (121 deg) _______ ~ 
MOS-l (O.64deg) 
S-lA (236 deg) 
Normally information gathered trom space is either recorded on an on board tape recorder to be 
p/ayed back when the sateJ/ite is over a ground receiving station or it can transmit the data via 
communication sateJ/ites to the main ground station. The latter depends on whether a communications 
spacecraft is capab/e of handling the data rates resu/ting from observation satellites. For examp/e, the 
US Landsat-5 transmits the TM data at a rate of 83 MB/s. Whi/e the French SPOT sate/lile has a tape 
recorder on board, its data transmission rate is 50 MB/s and that of the European ERS-1 is 100 MB/s. 
The commercial communications satellites are probably not capab/e of handling such large data rates 
at present. 
Using the ratio between the photographie reso/ution76 and pixel size of about two, resolutions of 
various commercially available data are indicated in Figure 1.4. The resolution in the Figure is in 
photographie resolution. 
76The concept of resolution is a complex one. The spatial resolving power or resolution of an imaging system is the ability of 
the sensor to record small details in the scene. The quantification of the smallest detail or size of object that can be seen in 
an image is, however, a complicated issue and depends both upon the spatial resolution ofthe system and the 
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Figure 1.4. Comparison of resolutions from different sensors ~sing various space platforms. All the figures are 
given in photographie resolution so as to facilitate the companson. 
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Imaging Self Scanning Sensor; MOS = Marine Observation Satellite; MSS= Multi-Spectral Scanner; Pan = Panchromatic; 
R = Russia; SPOT = System Pour l'Observation de la Terre; TM = Thematic Mapper; U = USA. 
characteristics of the scene being observed. These inciude lighting conditions, configuration, size and shape of the objects 
being observed and atmospheric effects on the light travelling to and from the object being observed. The resolving power of 
the sensor may be defined as the minimum distance between two identical small objects when they can still be distinguished 
as two separate objects. While such adefinition holds true for a photographic film camera system, for scanning devices a 
new concept, the instantaneous field of view (IFOV), has to be considered. The IFOV is defined as the size of the spot on 
the ground "seen" by one particular point in the image or seen bya scanning sensor at the instant of observation. A scanner 
is made of aseries of small sensors each of which is called a pixel or picture element. This represents the point in the 
image. In this report resolution is referred to as a pixel size or the photographic resolution (or ground resolution) which 
depends on the contrast ratio. For a contrast ratio of 2: 1, the resolution is about 2 to 2.4 times the IFOV. In this report it is 
taken to be two. 
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APPENDIX 
11 INTERPRETATION OF SATELLITE INFORMATION 
11.1 Type of space-based data 
. Sensors on board satellites record images of the earth's surface by measuring reflected solar or 
emitted energy o~ that scattered from aradar. Two types of imageries are commercially available. (i) 
From French, Indian and Russian satellites, high spatial resolution data (6m, 10m or about 1m pixel 
equivalent respectively) are acquired. These are panchromatic images and they record total reflected 
energy across a very broad waveband of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) throughout the visible 
and infrared range(0.51-0.73 jJm). (ii) lower spatial resolution data (20-50 m pixels) are available from 
French, Indian, Japanese, Russian and US satellites. These are multispectral images which record 
reflected and emitted energy simultaneously in a number of narrower wavebands of the EMS [0.45-0.52 
IJm (blue), 0.52-0.6 IJm (green), 0.6-0.7 IJm (red), 0.76-0.9 IJm (near infra red -IR), 1.55-1.75 IJm and 
2.08-2.35 IJm (far IR), and 10.40-12.50 IJm (thermal)]. While limitations of optical sensors are 
recognised, the use of radar data would extend the range of useful information available. Satellite data 
can be purchased as photographie prints, on computer compatible tapes (CCTs) or on CD-ROM. 
Clearly the first is the least flexible because image enhancement can be limited on a photographie 
image. However, this is the least expensive. All satellite data suppliers provide the data on CCTs or on 
CD-ROMs. Majority of the images used in this study were acquired on CCTs (see Table 11.1). Most 
currently available tape drives are designed to read CCTs recorded at 1,600 bits per inch (bpi) or 6,250 
bpi. Generally the data volume for each band in a multispectral image or that for a panchromatic image 
can be between 27 and 100 MBytes. 
All the field definitions generally follow American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and 
International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) standards. The file data on the whole are 
written in American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII) which uses 7 bits per 
character plus an additional bit reserved as either an extension of the character set or as a parity bit. 
The difference between different products may be found in the image structure. There are two types 
of formats for this: the Band-Interleaved-by-Line (Bll) and the Band-SeOuential (BSO). With the Bll 
option, there is only one imagery file for all the spectral bands. In this case each image line 
corresponds to several records depending on the number of spectral bands. For example, for SPOT 
each multispectral image line corresponds to three records, the first for spectral band XS1, the 
second for spectral band XS2, and the third for spectral band XS3. In the BSO structure, each 
spectral band constitutes aseparate logical volume77• For example, in the case of the US landsat 
multispectral data, there are seven logical volumes, each one comprising several files and in 
particular an auxiliary data file and an imagery file. Thus, spectral band 1 data are contained in the 
imagery file of the first logical volume, the spectral band 2 data in the imagery file of the second 
logical vOlume, and spectral band 3 image data in the third logical volume and so on. On the other 
hand the French SPOT images can be obtained in either Bil or BSO structure. Image data trom 
Indian IRS satellites contain actual video data in Bil format. 
77 A logical volume is a logical collection of one or more files recorded consecutively. A logicaJ vo/ume contains one or more 
bands for a scene. 
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Table 11.1. Spectral sensitivities of some of the civil satellites. (MESSR=Multispectral Electronic Self-Scanning 
Radiometer; VTIR=Visible and Thermal IR Radiometer; MSR=Microwave Scanning Radiometer). 
USA 0.45-0.52 30 Visible blue/1 
Landsat-4 & -5 0.52-0.60 Visible green/2 
0.63-0.69 Visible red/3 
0.76-0.90 Near infra-red/4 
1.55-1.75 Mid infra-red/5 
2.08-2.35 F ar infra-red/7 
10.40-12.50 120 Thermal infra-red/6 
France 0.50-0.59 20 Green/1 
SPOT-1, -2 &-3 0.61-0.68 Red/2 
0.79-0.89 Near -i Infra-red/3 
0.51-0.73 10 Panchromatic 
India 0.45-0.52 73 Visible blue/1 
IRS-1, -2 and- 0.52-0.59 Visible green/2 
1P 0.62-0.68 Visible red/3 
0.77-0.86 Near infra-red 
0.45-0.52 36 Blue/1 
0.52-0.59 Yellow/2 
0.62-0.68 Red/3 
0.77-0.86 Near infra-red 
IRS-1C 0.62-0.68 188 Visible 
0.77-0.86 Near infra-red 
0.52-0.59 23.5 Visible 
0.62-0.68 Visible 
0.77-0.86 Near infra-red 
0.50-0.75 5.8 Visible panchromatic 
Japan MOS·1 MESSR 
0.51-0.59 50 Visible 
0.61-0.69 Visible 
0.72-0.80 Near infra-red 
0.80-1.10 Near infra-red 
VTIR 
0.50-0.70 0.90km Visible 
6.0-7.0 27km Water vapour band 
10.5-11.5 Thermal infra-red 
11.5-12.5 Thermal infra-red 
MSR 
23.8 GHz 32km Microwave radiometer 
31.4 GHz 
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. Generally th~ images ean ?e ~re-proeessed by the suppliers to a required level. For example, the 
basle le~el eonsl~ts of normahsatlon of the CCO deteetor response in eaeh speetral band but no 
geometrie eorreetlons are performed. The next level may have radiometrie correetions as weil as 
geometrie correetions. These are distortions introduced by, for example, the earth's rotation and 
panoramie effeet. In this ease the absolute loeation aeeuraey eould be about BOOm. The next level in 
whieh, for example, geometrie and loeation aeeuraey have been enhanced; the loeation aeeuraey could 
be of the order of 30m. As the degree of eorreetions applied inereases, the cost of the data also 
inereases. 
For this study, optical and radar sensors have been used for observations of various nuelear 
facilities. Most of the data were aequired on CCTs with the basie radiometrie and geometrie correetions 
provided by the data suppliers. 
11.2 Some basics of image processing and interpretation 
Different materials on the earth's surfaee may appear similar in panchromatie images as they 
reflect the same total amount of solar energy. However, in certain bands of a multispeetral image sueh 
surface materials will reflect different amounts of energy and therefore appear different. Thus, 
multispectral images may contain a greater amount of information for discriminating different surface 
materials but the trade-off between speetral and spatial resolution means that panehromatic images 
may contain a greater amount of spatial detail for identifying surfaee features. Often the greatest 
amount of information can be derived by using both panehromatie and multispeetral images of the same 
area, in a eombined analysis. 
Generally optical and radar sensors are deployed on separate observation satellites. Examples of 
the former are the Freneh SPOT and the US Landsat satellites, and those of the latter are the 
European ERS-1, Canadian Radarsat and the Japanese JERS-1 spacecraft. Whilst the SPOT satellites 
carry panchromatie as weil as multispectral optieal sensors, only the latter is deployed on board the 
current US Landsat satellites. However, the range of wavelengths over which the sensor is sensitive is 
much greater for the Landsat satellites. Spectral sensitivities of some of the civil satellites are shown in 
Table 11.1. 
In electro-optical systems, signals are transmitted directly to a ground station for processing if the 
satellite is in line of site, relayed via satellites or they ean be recorded on a tape recorder for 
transmission at a later time. The signals are then converted into digital numbers representing images 
and processed for interpretation. 
Image processing . Since the scene is recorded on board the satellite in digital form, it is 
transmitted to ground station where computers reconstruct the image. Ouring the reconstruction of the 
image the computer decodes the binary data and allocates the appropriate tone to each pixeJ78. The 
image can then be displayed on a monitor screen or as a photographic print. However,. at. this stage the 
image is in a basic raw form which needs to be corrected for a number of factors. Thls IS termed pre-
processing. Initially the data, as acquired from the satellite, have to be corrected for the earth's 
78A scanning device on board a satellite consists of aseries of very small light sensors. Thus, when aresolution of a sensor 
is quoted as 30 m, it means each small sensor of the scanner records an ar~a, or a pixel,. 30 m x 30 m on the e~~'s surface. 
On the other hand for a photographic camera, the resolving p~wer o~ r~sol~tion may be slmply defin~d as the minImum 
distance between two identical sma" objects when they can still be dlstingUlshed as two separate obJects. 
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cu rvatu re , its rotation and for the errors introduced due to the attitude of the satellite and due to 
atmospheric distortions. Further corrections, such as the geometrie distortions resulting in uncertainties 
of a few kilometres in relative positions of objects in the scene become necessary, particularly when 
change detection is considered. This is either corrected by identitying a number of land marks such as 
airport landing-strips and highway intersections on the image and on a map and then calculating a 
least-square fit or by defining ground control points on the image and on aalready geocoded image of 
the same area. The results are then used to correct the whole image. This is called the geometric 
correction. 
Image processing involves, for example, contrast stretching. Sensors on board remote sensing 
satellites are designed with sensitivity over a very wide range of spectral intensity and wavelength of 
radiation. Thus, a sensor could be used, for example, to monitor very reflective surface of ice and 
relatively dark surface of forests and vegetation. However, in practice, generally such a wide range of 
variation does not occur in a scene so that the image often appears murky and even-toned. This is 
overcome by spreading the recorded reflectance values across the whole of the tonal range available. 
In this way the distinction between tones becomes much more pronounced. Thus, during the computer 
processing, the minimum and maximum reflectance values of the pixels present in the image are 
assigned 0 and 255 respectively and the individual values are stretched out maintaining the shape of 
the reflectance distribution curve. Thus, the tonal gaps between the values are widened. The result is a 
much more contrasting image. The process is called contrast stretching. In an electro-optical device, 
because the signal to noise ratio is much higher than that obtained on a photographic film (due to 
grain), it is possible to stretch the contrast. This would enable more information to be extracted from 
images from electro-optical devices. 
The gradations between 256 different tones are not distinguished by eye. One way of overcoming 
this is to assign different colours to different tones or a group of tones. Thus, during computer 
processing, in a particular spectral band, aseries of slices across the image are taken and assigned in 
an arbitrary way a colour to the particular group of digital numbers representing a particular feature. The 
process is applied to the whole of the image. In this way a rough classification is also obtained. The 
process is called density slicing. 
Apart from the above techniques to improve the ability to extract information and to interpret a 
digital image, edge enhancement is also used. This is the sharpening of edges to highlight objects of 
interest. 
Image interpretation. For monitoring the operational characteristics of nuclear facilities, Landsat 
type data are more useful because of the thermal band. A characteristic of an operating nuclear 
reactor, for example, is the discharge of warm water used to carry away heat from the reactor core. The 
water eventually is either discharged into a river, or a lake or into the sea. Detection of warm water 
would indicate, for example, that the plant is operational. 
Atmospheric scattering is more pronounced in the visible bands and increases as the wavelengths 
decrease. This corresponds to Landsat thematic mapper (TM) bands one, two and three. Thus, often 
bands three, four and five are used in order to minimise the atmospheric effects. Most vegetation is 
strongly reflective in the near IR (TM band four). In false colour IR photography, healthy forests and 
fields, for example, appear bright red. Fallow fields appear in grey or blue-grey hues. Coniferous forests 
appear dark red - sometimes almost black because of their overall low reflectance. Bands five and 
seven normally measure reflected energy which identity the absorption of water. As plant and soil 
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m~isture inerease,. th~ amount of energy refleeted in these bands deereases. Genera"y, the wetter the 
obJect, the darker It WI" appear in these bands. Thus, for example, rivers and lakes appear dark in band 
five. The TM sensor col/eets most thermal information using band six which deteets emitted energy. 
However, the spatial resolution is poor eompared to the other bands (120m pixel size). 
It should be remembered that red light travels some 5-10m through elear water. From space, 
~herefore, objects only 5-10m below the surface of the water could be seen in the Landsat TM images 
In band three and possibly band four. This is important in the context of this study. When determining 
the operational eharacteristics of a reactor, the temperature of a body of water used for coolin9 is used. 
If water is sha"ow, high reflectance may be registered in the thermal band because of the heating of the 
sma" volume of water by the sun. This may lead to misinterpretation of the data. While intense heat 
sources emit energy at shorter wavelengths making it possible to see the emitted energy in TM bands 
five and seven, it may not be useful for the detection of nuelear faeilities in their normaloperational 
mode. 
Thus, combination of visible bands one, two and three ereates an image whieh appears normal to 
the eyes when the three bands are assigned blue, green and red guns on a colour monitor respectively. 
Radiation in bands four, five and seven and the thermal band six are invisible to human eyes. Oata trom 
these bands ean be displayed individually as monoehromatie images or they can be presented in one or 
more of the blue, green and red colours as a composite to become visible. 
Interpretation is a proeess of extracting information from images. The amount of information that 
can be obtained from a partieular image and the aceuraey with whieh it is interpreted depends, to some 
extent, on the knowledge of the objeets and their refleetance characteristics, the area in the scene and 
the experienee that an interpreter has. The ability to recognise objeets depends on such faetors as the 
spectral and spatial resolutions, and eontrast in the image. Thus, interpretation essentia"y involves 
measuring objects in the scene, identitying them and using this and some ·co"ateral information" to 
answer some specifie questions. The latter eould, for example, be material trom open lite ra tu re , fjeld 
work and photo interpretation keys. 
Apart trom interpretation of images by humans, computer-aided interpretation is becoming very 
important. This is particularly so in treaty verification now because some of the recent treaties (for 
example, the Intermediate-range Nuelear Forces -INF) require detailed deseriptions of weapon faeilities 
and their line drawings. The latter eould be digitised enabling the computer to locate automatica"y and 
identity a partieular facility in a scene. This is called pattern recognition. While such teehniques can be 
used for relatively simple patterns deseribed in the INF treaty, automatie pattern recognitio~ is compl~x 
and perhaps the capability is not widely spread in the eivil fjeld. This and other faetors used In. automatie 
interpretation teehniques are summarised in Table 11.2. Interpretation in this report is interactlve and no 
automatie computer analyses were carried out. 
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It can be seen from Table 11.2 that spatial resolution is a very important factor in image 
interpretation process. Spectral sensitivity, when changes in the scene occur and stereoscopic images 
could also add considerably to the task of interpretation. Examples of these are the detection of the use 
of camouflage, changes in vegetation from nuclear radiation or the use and testing of biological 
weapons80 and chemicals from chemical weapons tests, possible detection of underground tests of 
explosives, particularly nuclear,81 and new constructions such as roads and mining activities. The 
image interpretation task is carried out at essentially five levels: detection which is the discovery of the 
existence of an object without recognising it; recognition is the ability to determine the identity of a 
feature er object in a scene; identification is the ability to place the identity of a feature or object in a 
scene as a precise type; description requires such items as size, configuratIon, components 
construction and count of equipment; and analysis in which precise description of a feature or an object 
or component in the scene is given. The resolutions of sensors required for these tasks will vary. Most 
of the time, resolution between 1m and 30m (pixel size) would be adequate for most verification 
purposes. 
11.3 Some signatures for recognition of undeclared facilities 
Some signatures associated with various components of the nuclear fuel cycle which might be 
recognised in images acquired from civil remote sensing satellites are summarised in this section. It is 
expected that a civil nuclear facility could be recognised because of light passive protection and lack of 
active security arrangements such as anti-aircraft and missile defence systems that usually surround a 
military complex. Also using multispectral images, particularly in the thermal IR region of the spectral 
bands, it is expected that the purpose of a nuclear reactor, for example, could be determined by 
monitoring excess heat generated. For plutonium production, most common reactor types would have 
79 Ondrejka, R.J., in Arms Control Verification, (edt) Tsipis, K., Hafemeister, D.W., and Janeway, P., (Pergamon/Brassey's, 
New York, 1986), p.96. 
8oGoldman, M., Ustin, S., and Warman, E.A., "Radiation exposure near Chernobyl based on analysis of satellite images", 
U.S. Department of Energy Report no. UCD·472-510, December 1987; and Linthicum, K.J.L., Baily, CL, Davies, F.G., 
and Tucker, C.J., "Detection of Ritt Valley fever viral activity in Kenya by satellite remote sensing imagery", Science, vol. 235, 
27 March 1987, pp.1656-1659. 
81Jasani, B., "Verification of a comprehensive test ban treaty from space - A preliminary study", Published by the United 
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva, 1994. 
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to be shut down frequently in order to remove the fuel so as to avoid the build up of undesirable 
isotopes of plutonium. When being used solely for power production, for economic reasons, power 
plants are allowed to operate for longer periods of time and shut down only for more infrequent 
refuelling and servicing. Exceptions to this are the Candu and the Magnox reactors for wh ich on load 
refuelling is possible. But here again, when refueling or changing fuel pins, the reactor power output 
lowered resulting in possible less thermal output. On the other hand if such facilities are under the IAEA 
safeguards, then on site cameras would detect any movements of the fuel from the reactors. 
A plutonium production facility capable of producing 1 ,OOOkg of plutonium a year would generate 
waste heat at an average rate of about three megawatts.82 The hot water from a production reaetor is 
usually discharged into a river, a lake, a cooling pond or through cooling towers. In the case of a lake or 
apond, unless the water is efficiently mixed, it would be difficult to hide the rise in temperature of water 
from satellite-based thermal sensors. 
Thus the task for observation satellites in monitoring deelared and undeelared faeilities would be to: 
a) monitor dismantling or shut-down of plutonium produetion plants using thermal IR sensor and 
possibly radar; 
b) monitor start-up dates and mode of operation (e.g. operational eyele) of known operational 
production and eertain power reactors; 
e) monitor operational characteristics of research reaetors and their possible upgrading; 
d) deteet undeclared faeilities and monitor the items listed in (a)-(c); and 
e) monitor other fuel eyele facilities such as mining and milling and spent fuel storage areas. 
82von Hippie, F., and Lev!, B. G., "c~ntrol\ing nuclear weapo~s at the ~~~:~:::!~::~ ~~: =:~~:/~~~:~~ ~f 
plutonium and highly ennched uranlum tor nuclear weapons , Arms -B 's Washington, 1986) p. 377. 
possible, (edt) Tsipis, K, Hafemeister, D.W., and Janeway, P., (pergamon rassey , 
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APPENDIX 
111 Change detection pre-processing 
111.1 Change detection 
Change deteetion is a proeess in whieh differences in the status of an object or a phenomenon are 
identified by observing them at different times.B3 This essentially assurnes that ehanges in buildings 
and associated infrastructure will result in changes in grey level values of the relevant pixels. However, 
changes have to be larger than those due to ehanges in the radiance caused by natural factors such as 
differences in atmospheric conditions or in the sun angle or differences in soil moisture. Some of these 
effects can be reduced. For example, satellite data should be acquired at the same time of the year in 
order to avoid the problems of different sun angles and status of the vegetation. Correction due to 
different atmospheric conditions depends on the knowledge of both the radiometrie values of 
objects/areas of interest and the meteorological eonditions. Other factors that may indicate that there 
are changes in an image are, for example, insufficient co-registration of two images and different 
illumination due to different elevation of the sun. 
1II.2Spatial registration 
Analysis of multi-temporal data requires accurate spatial registration of the images. The software, 
GCPWorks (EASI PACE), used in the present study for this co-registration, offers different 
mathematical models (polynomial transformations first to fifth order, thin plate spline) or mosaicking and 
re-sampling methods (nearest neighbour, bilinear interpolation and eubie convolution). The registration 
of the two geocoded Landsat TM Images as weil as the registration of the high resolution KVR-1000 
image were carried out using the first order nearest neighbour algorithm; the registration of one 
geocoded and one non-geocoded Landsat TM image was done by a third order cubic convolution. 
1II.3Radiometric correction 
In addition, radiometrie correction needs to be applied before proceeding with the detection of 
changes in a scene. The radiance signature for a given object va ries with changes in radiometrie 
conditions, particularly those due to atmospheric conditions and the sun azimuth and elevation angles 
that are generally provided in the header of satellite images. These effeets can be corrected using 
either the EASI PACE module Atmospheric Correetion, Lowtran-7 or 56 code that can be down loaded 
from the Internet. Also self-written programme software packages could be used. 
83/bid. Kokoski, p. 109. 
83 Singh, Ashbindu (1989): "Digital change detection techniques using remotely-sensed data", International Journal of 
Remote Sensing, vol. 10, no. 6, pp.989-1003. 
POSSIBLE ApPLICATIONS OF COMMERCIAL SATELLITE IMAGERY FOR INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS 
APPENDIX 
IV Mathematical description of principal component analysis and 
multivariate alteration detection 
IV.1 Principal component analysis 
111 
Representing multispectral pixel intensities measured at two different times by random vectors 
X(Tl) and X(T2): 
[ 
Xl (I;) ] 
XCI;) = : 
XN(I;) 
we consider a bi-temporal feature space for the ith component 
For each spectral band we seek linear combinations 
Y = aT X = alXdTi )+a2Xd12) 
such that the transformed vector has maximum variance: 
var( Y) = var( a T X ) ~ maximum. 
This establishes the first principal axis, along which the temporally corre/ated pixels (no-change 
pixels) will lie. Hence the projection of pixel intensity orthogonal to the first principle axis - Le. the 
second principal component - is a measure of change. The principal axes may be determined by 
diagonalizing the sampIe covariance matrix for the bi-temporal image. The eigenvectors then give the 
principal axis directions, while the corresponding eigenvalues are the variances of the data along these 
directions. Thus a threshold in units of standard deviations along the second principal axis (change 
axis) is determined by the square root of the smaller of the two eigenva/ues of the covariance matrix. 
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IV.2 Multivariate Alteration Detection (MAD) 
If we represent multispectral pixel intensities measured at two different times by random vectors X 
andY: 
y=[l J 
N being the number of spectral components, then we seek linear combinations 
u =aTX =a1X1 + ... +aNXN 
v =bTy =b1l'; + ... +bNYN 
such that the different of the transformed vectors has maximum variance: 
T T • 
var( u - v ) = var( a X - b Y) ~ maXimum, 
subject to the constraints 
var( u ) = var( v ) = 1. 
Under these constraints we have 
var( u - v ) = var( u ) + var( v ) - 2 cov( u, v ) = 2( 1 - corr( u, v )). 
Therefore we seek vectors a and b which minimise the positive correlation corr(u,v). 
Determination of the linear combinations is done by canonical correlation analysis which is described 
. A d 84 e.g. In n erson . 
The multivariate alteration detection is defined as 
where ai and bi are the defining coefficients from a standard canonical correlation analysis. X and Y are 
vectors with mean zero. 
84 T.w. Anderson: An Introduction to Multivariate Statistical Analysis, 2nd edition, New York. Wiley, 1984, pp. 480-520. 
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APPENDIX 
V EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING REQUIREMENTS 
V.1 Equipment 
It is often argued that the equipment85 and the operational costs of an image interpretation centre 
would be too high for an Agency such as the IAEA However, the cost of equipment for the WEU 
Satellite Centre (WSC) indicate that it may not be so high. This centre was established by the WEU 
Member States in 1991 at Torrej6n near Madrid, Spain. It was declared operational in 1995.86 The main 
tasks for the WSC are: 
• verification of arms control agreements; 
• monitoring crises affecting European security; 
• monitoring risks to the environment. 
In this chapter, the equipment and the man power requirements are considered very briefly should 
the IAEA decide to use data obtained from space. Should such adecision be taken, then it would be 
necessary to establish equipment essential to perform the following tasks: 
• Data reception 
• Data storage 
• Data retrieval 
• Data processing 
• Data output 
• Data management 
Data reception 
As mentioned in appendix " space-based information comes, tor example, in the form of 
photographic prints, positive or negative transparency, CCT or CD-ROM. These must be logged by the 
system and stored in such a way that the information is retrieved with ease. The data needed for such a 
centre are not always satellite images in digital form, but could also be, for example, treaty documents, 
maps, and general information on a country's nuclear programme and even its attitude towards all 
aspects of the uses of nuclear energy. 
85The information for this section is based on the data provided by Cray Systems, who were the prime contraclor equipping 
the Western European Union Satellite Centre in Madrid, Spain. 
86Letter from the Assembly, No. 22, September 1995, (Information Letter from the Assembly of Western European 
Union), p.2. 
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A typical system for receiving the data could be tape readers and scanners. The former would read 
satellite imagery data for processing and interpretation while the latter would read documents such as 
maps and even photographic imageries. It should be remembered that the satellite data provided by 
various suppliers are never in standard format. The data reception would convert the information into 
the form that the image processing system can handle. A very important function of the data reception 
section is quality control. Its function is to check that any data received by the centre are accurate and 
of high quality. 
Data storage 
All data stored at the Agency Library must be recorded in such a way that a user can search using 
many different criteria (cataloguing). It should be also be stored in such a way that its retrieval is easy. 
The data can be stored, for example, on Winchester hard disk, tapes, re-writeable optical disk and CD-
ROM. The latter is preferred because of its longevity, but for speed of writing and the speed of access, 
the Winchester hard disk has considerable advantage. 
Data retrieval 
In order to retrieve data, a common technique is to use the Browse facility provided by 
manufacturers of equipment. This usually consists of sub-sampled version of the map and image data 
stored in the Library. Because they are small in size, a few kB, they can give a near real-time view of 
the data. 
Data processing 
Once a set of data is selected, the appropriate tools are required to process and analyse the data. 
There are many image processing packages available (for example, ERDAS, ERMAPPER, and PCI) 
the choice of which will depend on the needs and particular requirements of the data centre. The 
requirements are: 
• ability to read many different data sets 
• ability to make measurements 
• variety and fidelity of data filters 
• "mosaicing" capability 
• ability to superimpose data sets from different sources 
• links to vector geographic information systems (GIS) 
• support for a wide range of printing and plotting equipment. 
Apart from the ability to process image (raster) data, the need to interpret vector data is becoming 
increasingly important. Many maps are now provided in a vector GIS form which allows attribute 
information (such as width of road, height above sea-Ievel, and surface type) to be associated with a 
line. The ability to overlay this map information on top of the raster data is vital and the ability to then 
edit the vector data whilst it is superimposed is extremely useful. 
POSSIBLE ApPLICATIONS OF COMMERCIAL SATELLITE IMAGERY FOR INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS 115 
Data output 
As the Agency deals with a wide variety of data, it needs a corresponding wide range of data 
output devices. Some are specific for particular data-types (for example, pen-plotter for maps) but 
others can be used for all data-types so that the most suitable one can be chosen. A typical set of data 
output devices could include: 
• Dye-sublimation printers 
• Thermal-wax printers 
• Pen plotters 
• Ink-jet plotters 
• Electrostatic plotters 
• Screen copiers 
• A fully-functioning photographic laboratory 
Data and network management 
The size and sophistication of the data centre should be in relation to the amount of work it is 
expected to perform. The computer system chosen must be able to grow with the data centre's 
requirements. This leads to a computer architecture in which the data are held centrally and the users 
have powerfuI desk-top workstations. The links between the server and workstations are provided by a 
local area network (LAN). A popular computer operating system must be chosen. UNIX is the current 
market-Ieader and is supported by a number of very powerful workstations (SUN, Digital, Hewlett-
Packard, IBM etc.) and has a large amount of suitable application software. 
System configuration 
A very basic system is eonsidered in order to get some idea of the type of equipment that might be 








One data-reeeption and data-retrieval workstation (UNIX mid-range workstation with 64 MB 
RAM,1 GB disk graphie card, CCT and CD-ROM readers) 
One data proeessing workstation (UNIX high-range workstation with 64 MB RAM, 1 GB disk, 
32-bit graphie card) 
One data server (UNIX high-range workstation with 64 Mb RAM, 20 GB disk) 
One AO digitiser 
One A4 dye-sublimation printer 
One AO plotter 
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• One A4 monochrome laser printer 
• Ethernet network 
Off-the-shelf software: 
• Image processing software 
• Vector GIS 
• Word-processor - for document generation 
• Relational database - as the library database 
A more sophisticated system would upgrade such components as the data storage system fram a 
workstation to a proper data server with possibly optical disk juke-box. Other items that can be added, 
for example, are more image processing workstations. 
Gasts 
The overall cost of the equipment is likely to be of the order of E400,OOO. Details of these are 
shown in Table 111.1. There would be additional costs for, for example, project management, installation 
and setting to work, training for the use of the equipment piece by piece and the system as a whole, 
site installation design and testing (factory acceptance, site acceptance). This could weil double the 
cost of the equipment. 
V.2 Training requirements 
Training requirements will depend on image interpretation tasks, the kind of imagery used and on 
the image processing, image analysis, data extraction and information handling equipment and 
software packages available. The first requirement would be the understanding of image structures of 
different sources of digital images. The next is the understanding of the image processing and 
information handling, such as merging of different images and data sets and computer assisted 
geographic information systems (GIS). The knowledge of various image enhancement techniques, 
interactive as weil as automated, would also be required. 
It would also be essential to learn about the objects to be interpreted in an image. For this it would 
be necessary to know their shapes and dimensions. The knowledge of the spectral properties of 
materials expressed as reflectance of surfaces in the visible as weil as in the IR range of the spectrum 
is also needed. For thermal IR radiation, the relationship with temperature, thermal inertia and heat 
emissivity needs to be studied. 
For SAR, knowledge of surface properties such as the dielectric properties and the effects of look 
angle and scan direction with respect to the orientation of objects would be required so as to be able to 
interpret radar images. The knowledge of the ability of objects to reflect different wavelengths of 
radiation is also of considerable importance. An appreciation of stereo images and their advantages 
and limitations need to be studied. 
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The understanding of natural features on the earth's surface, such as soil pattems and vegetation, 
and man-made features, such as land use, technical infrastructure for transport and communications, 
housing and mining, would also help in image interpretation task. Among the man-made activities, it is 
important to be able to distinguish between civilian and military activities. 
Access to very high resolution satellite imagery data has been confined to only the USA and Russia 
and to so me extent the People's Republic of China (PRC). The first two states share, to a limited 
extent, such data with their allies. However, this changed somewhat when France launched its 
military reconnaissance satellite (Helios-1) in 1995. It has agreed to share so me of the data with the 
WSC. During its experimental phase of three years, the WSC trained its statt using civil satellite 
imagery. Whilst the quality of data from Helios-1 is probably not as good as those from, for example, 
the US reconnaissance satellites, it is considerably better than civil remote sensing data. Therefore, 
the WSC should be able to implement its task more ettectively. Nevertheless, the training that the 
WSC photo-interpreters received from the use of civil data is likely to be of considerable value. For 
the foreseeable future, very high resolution data is not going to be available to many. It is generally 
assumed that verification and crisis monitoring cannot be carried out using civil satellites because 
"you cannot see much". Such a conclusion in drawn by people who have either used aerial 
observation data only or they have access to images fram military reconnaissance satellites and, 
therefore, they tend to discard the value of commercial satellite data. 
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Table V.1. Cost of various basic equipment eontinued on page 119 
Scanner 40 40 
CD-ROM 
EXABYTE 2 2 
CCT 6 6 
Workstation ineluding: 16 16 
Graphie board 4 4 
Disk (2 GB) 
Database software 
Ingestion software 10 10 
Data storage 
Server including 20 20 
Disk (2 GB) 10 10 
CD-ROM 
EXABYTE 
Database software 10 10 
Retrieval 
Workstation ineluding: 16 16 
Graphie board 4 4 
Disk (2 GB) 
Database software 
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Table V.1 continued. Cost of various basic equipment. 87 
Processing. devices 
Workstation including: 2 20 40 
Second monitor 2 3 6 
Graphie board 4 4 16 
Disk (2 GB) 4 4 
AO Digitiser 2 3 6 
IP software 2 40 80 
GIS software 2 40 80 
Database software 2 2 
Word-processing software 2 3 6 
Output devices 
A4 colour printer (high resolution) 6 6 
A4 monochrome printer 2 2 
AO Plotter 6 6 
Network 
It is very important to realise that when using civil satellite data, it is essential to have considerable 
knowledge of the type of objects and activities being investigated in the image. Therefore, the first task 
for a trainer is to make the trainee aware of the availability of information in either the public domain or 
within organisations such as the IAEA. With such knowledge and knowing the shapes and sizes of the 
objects being investigated in an image, it is possible to extract considerable amount of information from 
87The prices do not include the cost of custorn software, installation and delivery charges. 
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even the crude images obtained from civil remote sensing satellites. For example, while it is not 
possible to detect a helicopter by a civil satellite carrying an optical sensor, it is perfectly possible for it 
to detect and identify a helicopter base. Using, for example, data acquired from aradar satellite over 
the same area, it is possible to identify very strang signatures over each helicopter pad when a vehicle 
is present thus indicating the presence of a helicopter. Also if the operational characteristics of a 
nuclear facility is to be determined, it is necessary to use a multispectral image rather than just high 
resolution panchromatic data. For example, an image in the thermal band of a Landsat satellite could 
give information on whether a reactor is operating by determining the temperature of water in a lake, 
river, or a reservoir into which the cooling water may be discharging. Thus, it is not necessary only to 
look at the activities going on around a facility with a very high resolution image. It should be 
recognised, therefore, that data from several types of sensors may be used to get a complete picture of 
what is happening on the ground. 
In the case of inspectors who are used to looking at facilities on the ground, it is important that they 
can relate the shapes and sizes of various types of facilities observed in a satellite image. For this, it is 
important that the interpreters are able to combine data to obtain stereoscopic images. Not only this but 
they should be able to combine images from different satellite sensors to extract both spectral and 
spatial information. 
Thus, perhaps the most important task for a trainer is to be able to change the mindset of 
interpreters who may be used to looking at very high resolution data. Furthermore, an interpreter needs 
to have extensive knowledge of arms control agreements and the types of activities to be monitored. 
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ACRONYMS 
Advaneed Gas-cooled Reaetor 
Americium 
Appendix 
Ameriean National Standard Institute 
Ameriean Standard Code for Information Interchange 
Band-Interleaved-by-Line 
British Nuelear Fuel pie 
Band-SeQential 
Computer Compatible Tape 
Compaet Disk-Read-Only Memory 
Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales 
Conference on Disarmament 
Dots Per Inch 
Demoeratic People's Republic of Korea 
Electro-Magnetie Speetrum 
Earth Observation Satellite Company 
European Remote Sensing 
Giga Byte 
Giga Hertz 
Geographie Information System 
International Atomie Energy Ageney 
Instantaneous Field of View 
Intermediate-range Nuelear Forees 
Information Cireular 
Iterative Principal Component Analysis 
Infra-Red 
Indian Remote Sensing satellite 
International Organisation for Standardisation 
Japanese Earth Remote Sensing satellite 
Kilo Byte 
Local Area Network 
Multivariate Alteration Deteetion 
Mega Byte 
Multi-speetral Eleetronic Self-Scanning Radiometer 
Mega-Hertz 
Marine Observation Satellite 
Mixed Oxide 
Mierowave Scanning Radiometer 
Mega Watt Electrieity 
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Non-Proliferation of nuelear weapons Treaty 
Nuelear-Weapon-State 
Prineipal Component 
Prineipal Component Analysis 
People's Republie of China 
Plutonium 
Random-Aeeess Memory 
Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation 
Strategie Arms Limitation Talks 
Synthetie Aperture Radar 
Systeme Probatoire d'Observation de la Terre 
Strategie Arms Reduetion Talks 
Separative Work 
Thermal Oxide Reproeessing Plant 
Thematie Mapper 
Variable Random-Aeeess Memory 
Visible and Thermal IR Radiometer 
Western European Union 
WEU Satellite Centre 
Multi-Speetral 
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